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Notwithstanding considerable efforts on the legal and institutional fronts, financial 
markets in many transition countries countries are still fragile and too thin in order to 
fulfil their economic functions. The enforcement of rules, good practices and legal 
provisions – albeit formally stated – is often hampered by remaining deficiencies in the 
surveillance agencies and by the behaviour of agents which are not completely 
accustomed to market oriented mechanisms. This paper summarises the structure of the 
financial systems, particularly of the banking sector, in European south-eastern 
countries (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia FYR, Romania, 
Yugoslavia FR) and Slovenia. Reforms and economic development in these countries 
are at a very different stage; however it could be of some interest to summarise some 
common regional features such as development patterns in the last decade, banking 
reforms, size and role of the financial system and banking crisis. This is done in the first 
part of this paper. Country specific profiles are presented in the second part. 
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1. Summary and conclusions 
1 
The paper analayzes the banking and financial sector in the Republics of former Yugoslavia 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia FYR, Slovenia, Yugoslavia FR), Albania, Bulgaria and 
Romania which, except Slovenia, are commonly referred to as South-Eastern Europe (thereafter SEE-8). 
The countries in the region share the legacy of a centrally planned economy. Their transition paths and 
economic performances were marked, however, by initial conditions, political systems and economic 
structures which widely differed, ranging from extremely closed and predominantly rural Albania to the 
heavily industrialised Yugoslavia FR and the Western trade-oriented Slovenia. In the transition process 
SEE-8 countries are less advanced than Central European countries but ahead of other transition countries 
such as most of the former USSR republics. Following a deep recession in the early 1990s, growth 
recovered in all countries but only for few of them it was stable and sustainable; some countries were 
beset between 1996 and 1999 by a banking and financial crisis showing the fragility of the results 
achieved so far: privatisation, legal and institutional reforms were not enough. At the same time, the 
reform and reorganisation of the financial system proved to be particularly difficult. The persistence of a 
wide “grey area” in banks’ corporate governance, management, credit practices, linkages to enterprises 
and government financing, left inefficiencies and structural weaknesses in the banking sector. Moreover, 
banking reform is a politically sensitive issue both for the social and the economic consequences of 
banks’ failures and because banks are the main vehicle for the transmission of monetary and financial 
impulses to the economy and the main instrument for the implementation of stabilisation programs. On 
the other hand central banks often lack the expertise, the independence, sometimes even the structures and 
the authority to adequately perform the surveillance function entrusted to them. Financial and banking 
crises in the SEE-8 region mainly originated from the microeconomic mismanagement of single 
intermediaries often linked to the risky environment, lax surveillance rules and corruption. Sometimes, 
like in Croatia in 1998, macroeconomic imbalances and a tight monetary and fiscal stance exacerbated the 
banking crisis; in other cases, like in Albania, notwithstanding dramatic social consequences the financial 
crisis had only a marginal impact on banks and enterprises because the size of credit intermediation was 
relatively low. The extent of the domino effect generated by a single default was a function of the overall 
fragility and inefficiencies of the entire banking and financial system; the ability to contain this domino 
effect and manage the crisis depended also on the degree of political stability as the opposite cases of 
Croatia and Bulgaria testify.  
The fragility of the banking and financial system in terms of structure, size, operations, 
management, corporate governance, markets and surveillance; the need to effectively enforce rules and 
Western-oriented legal frameworks; improved transparency in the judicial system; the need to develop 
capital markets in order to provide additional financial resources to the enterprise sector are, in our view, 
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the issues to be addressed in order to increase the effectiveness of the reform effort before one can claim 
that the transition process is completed.  
2. Economic performance and transition 
The economic size of the entire SEE-8 region is small compared to any major EU 
country: in 2000 SEE-8 population stood at around 57 million people, roughly the same 
as, but its GDP around US$ 110 billion was equivalent to a mere 8 per cent of that of 
Italy. Economic standards are low: current per capita GNP is around US$ 1,655 (19,100 
in Italy) while in terms of purchasing power parity it stands (1999) at US$ 4,300 
(20,750 in Italy). The SEE-8 economic system is, on average, fragile: in 1999 growth in 
the area was almost null while in 2000 growth recovered at an average around 3 percent, 
unemployment was around 20 per cent, the central government deficit reached 5 per 
cent of GDP, the current account deficit 7 per cent, the stock of total external debt 50 
per cent of GDP and total debt service around 13 per cent of exports. SEE-8 exports are 
mainly directed towards industrial countries (68 per cent) and, in particular, Western 
Europe (64 per cent); likewise, 67 per cent of imports comes from industrial countries 
(63 per cent from Western Europe). Among European countries, Italy and Germany are 
the main partners accounting each for 20 and 17 per cent of total SEE-8 exports and 
imports, respectively. Trade flows within the region are comparatively small: 11.5 per 
cent for exports and 7.5 per cent for imports. This could be due to political frictions 
persisting in the region and to similarities in the production structure. 
Beyond the average picture, the SEE-8 region is characterised by fairly significant differences at 
the country level. Slovenia – which is part of the CEFTA-5 (Central Europe Free Trade Area, together 
with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) – is the most advanced and stable economy and 
is a candidate for EU accession; with per capita GDP of US$ 9,200 (US$ 15,000 in PPP), Slovenia can be 
compared with European countries at intermediate stages of development. Croatia stands out in terms of 
economic size, stage of development and political institutions. In terms of per capita GDP, Croatia can be 
regarded as an upper-middle-income country. Bulgaria, Macedonia FYR and Romania, with per capita 
GDP in the range of US$ 1,400-1,700, are in the class of lower-middle-income countries while Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia FR, ranging from US$ 700 to 900, are slightly better than low-
income countries. 
 
Main Economic Indicators for the SEE-8 Region 
                 
  Albania  Bosnia  H.  Bulgaria  Croatia  Macedonia Romania Slovenia Yugoslavia  SEE-8  Italy  EMU  1998 
Population (1999, mil.) (a)  3.4  3.9  8.2  4.5  2.0  22.5  2.0  10.6  57.1  58  291 
GNP p.c. (1999, Atlas) (a)  870  692  1,380  4,580  1,690  1,520  9,890  726  1,655  19,710  21,680   7  
GNP p.c. PPP (1999, US$ ) (a)  2,892  n.a.  4,914  6,915 4,339 5,647  15,062 n.a.  4,328  20,751  20,990 
GNP p.c. PPP (1989,US$) (b)  1,400  n.a.  5,000  6,171  3,394  3,470  9,200  n.a.  ...  ...  ... 
GDP (US$ bill.)  (f)  3.7  5.4  12.1  19.8  3.3  37.9  18.3  7.7  108.1  1,077  5,756 
GNP annual growth (f)  7.8  13.7  5.0  3.5  6.0  2.0  4.9  -19  3.0  2.9  3.4 
Unemployment (% pop.) (c)  20  40  16  21  35  12  13  26.5  19.2  ...  9.0 
Central Gov bal. (%GDP) (d)  -8.5  -25  2.8  -1.3  -5  -3.9  -0.6  -30  -5.1  -0.3  -0.7 
Current acc. bal. (% GDP) (d)  -1.8  -39.2  -0.5  -7.7  -8.5  -8.6  0.0  -18.5  -7.1  1.8  -0.4 
Total debt stock (% GDP) (e)  28.6  36.1  90.3  40.5  72.4  27.0  29.0  144.6  49.2  ...  ... 
Total debt serv. (% exports) (e)  4.5    22.1  8.9  13  23.5  7.7  2.0  13.5  ...  ... 
Sources: (a) World Bank, World Development Indicators; (b) de Melo, Denizer, Gelb (1996); (c) Stiblar (1999); (d) World Bank, 
World Economic Report; (e) World Bank, Global Development Finance; (f) Current market price (IMF). 
(1) Without Slovenia GNP p.c. in SEE-8 is US$ 1,360;  (2) For Bosnia H., Macedonia FYR and Yugoslavia FR, source (c). 
 
All countries experienced a sharp deterioration of economic fundamentals at the initial stages of 
the transition process. It could be of some interest to look at the evolution of GNP per capita in 
purchasing power parity from 1989 to 1999. In every country living standards improved: by 50 per cent in 
Albania, by 38 per cent in Slovenia and Romania, by 20 per cent in Macedonia FYR, by 10 per cent in 
Croatia. The only country that recorded a contraction (around 2 per cent) is Bulgaria.  
Almost every country adopted comparable policy measures to regain economic 
stability: tight monetary and fiscal policies to reduce inflation and fiscal imbalances; 
control of capital account transactions and management of the exchange rate; 
privatisation, legal and fiscal reforms in the commercial and financial arena; 
rehabilitation and restructuring of the banking and the industrial sectors; reorientation of 
trade patterns toward more sophisticated products and Western partners.  
The SEE-8 countries have adopted widely different monetary and exchange rate 
regimes. Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina are under a currency board arrangement, 
Albania and Yugoslavia have adopted independent floating, while Croatia, Macedonia 
and Slovenia have opted for a managed float, with a peg to the euro within a band; only 
Romania has associated a managed float with monetary targeting. In general, these 
countries have decided to pursue a rule-based monetary policy with euro as an anchor 
because they were experiencing both asset and currency substitution, hence high 
volatility of the velocity of money. In these circumstances monetary growth targets are 
an inefficient method for controlling inflation.  
 
Exchange rate arrangements and anchors of monetary policy 
 
Country  Exchange rate regime      Monetary policy framework 
Albania  Independent float  Monetary targeting (M3)   8  
Bosnia H.  Currency Board  Exchange rate anchor (euro) 
Bulgaria   Currency Board  Exchange rate anchor (euro) 
Croatia  Managed Float  Peg to the euro within a band 
FYR Macedonia  Managed Float  Peg to the euro within a band 
Romania  Managed Float  Monetary targeting (M3) 
Slovenia  Managed Float  Peg to the euro within a band 
Yugoslavia  Independent float  Monetary targeting (primary money) 
Source: National Central Banks. 
 
Varying degrees of deepness, speed and success of the reform process characterise each country’s 
transition profile which, ultimately, is influenced by the country-specific initial conditions, the length and 
intensity of war and other external shocks, the social and political consensus on economic reforms. The 
Republics of ex-Yugoslavia had to sustain additional efforts: build new institutions and design new 
markets, overcome the spatial organisation of the former federate State with its strong regional economic 
specialisation and achieve a more balanced structure suited for an independent State. For some countries, 
such as Slovenia, Croatia and Albania, the worst phase of economic transition was already over in 1992-
93; for countries which suffered from a longer and devastating war period, this phase lasted until 1995-
96. 
Transition recessions have sometimes been compared to Schumpeter’s process of 
“creative destruction” since they are associated with the reallocation of resources from 
old, traditional and often inefficient industrial sectors to new and more efficient 
initiatives. However, transition recessions have proven to be dramatically deeper, faster 
and more pervasive than the “creative destruction”. The overall fall of GDP has been 
contained at around 15 per cent in Slovenia, but elsewhere reached 60 per cent or more; 
e.g. in Albania, Bosnia H., Macedonia FYR and Yugoslavia FR. Following 
stabilisation, GDP growth recovered all over the SEE-8 region but conditions for 
sustained development were not there. Sometimes between 1996 and 1998 almost every 
country recorded a new GDP contraction, which was in some cases rather dramatic such 
as in Albania. Notable exemptions are Slovenia, Bosnia and, to some extent, Croatia. 
Since 1993 Slovenia registered a stable, albeit modest, growth in the 3-5 per cent range; 
since war ended in 1995, Bosnia had a cumulative GDP increase of around 30-35 per 
cent; in 1998 Croatia prospects became gloomy following a sharp deterioration in 
fundamentals and a deep banking crisis but recession was averted and growth recovered 
in 2000.  
3. The financial sector: transition, structure, size, reforms 
3.1 The legacy of centrally planned economies   9  
Banks play a dominant role in the financial sector of all countries under review. Capital markets 
are practically limited to the equity markets and are, in general, quite fragile and underdeveloped. Other 
financial intermediaries, where in place, are mainly represented by insurance companies, pension funds 
and investment companies which are involved in the privatisation process acting as intermediaries 
between State agencies and private subscribers. 
The legacy of planned economies in the banking and financial sector is well 
known. Under the former regime financial intermediaries, according to Western 
standards, were simply non existing. Banks were asked to extend credit according to the 
directives of the economic plan without any credit screening or control on borrowers’ 
creditworthiness; they were simply agencies for the allocation of budget resources. Bad 
performing loans were kept in banks’ portfolios; underestimated by weak accounting 
practices they greatly contributed to the quasi-fiscal deficit that emerged when the 
former regime collapsed. Partially eroded by the hyperinflation of the early 1990s bad 
loans were one of the main causes of the fragility of the banking sector.  
The banking system in the former Yugoslavia had a somewhat different story than 
in other planned economies. Since 1971 Yugoslavia had a worker self-management 
system and in 1974 constitutional changes greatly enlarged the power of individual 
republics, provinces and local governments but the financial consequences of local 
mismanagement fell on the central government and the central bank. Enterprises were 
entitled to bank ownership; Yugoslav banks were, therefore, accustomed to commercial 
activities but they were a “service center” for credit and other financial facilities for 
enterprises.  
During the 1980s an economic crisis erupted due to the overvalued exchange rate, 
poor trade performance, low productivity growth and accumulated fiscal deficits. Policy 
failures to address rising inflation and external shocks – such as the sharp increase in oil 
prices, the world-wide recession and the international debt crisis, exacerbated 
Yugoslavia’s crisis. Stabilisation and reform plans aimed at financial restructuring of 
self-managed enterprises failed and in the mid-1980s their estimated losses were around 
6-7 per cent of GDP while the quasi-fiscal deficit in the balance sheet of the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia reached 8-9 per cent of GDP. In 1989 the banking structure, 
operations, corporate governance and accounting practices were reshaped by a new 
banking law. In May 1990 the restructuring of illiquid banks began with the aim of 
reaching, if deemed necessary, an “exit” from the market but the declaration of   10  
independence by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and the outbreak of civil strife signed the 
collapse of the Federation. 
There are at least four other aspects of the SEE-8 banking system worth 
mentioning: (1) the size of the banking sector and its importance in extending credit to 
the private sector; (2) the risk profile of loan portfolios; (3) the reform of the payment 
system; (4) the effective observance of international standards and codes.  
 
1.   An idea of the size of SEE-8 financial system and the role of banks in providing 
credit to the private sector can be offered by the following, albeit crude, indicators: 
Monetary and Banking Intermediation Indicators for the SEE-8 Region 
(per cent of GDP; end-1999) 
                
 Albania  Bosnia  H.  Bulgaria  Croatia  Macedon.  Romania  Slovenia  Yugosl.  SEE-8 (1)  EMU 
Money  20.2 13.7 13.5  9.6  10.2  5.5  9.7  n.a.  8.4  2.6 
Quasi  Money  (2)  37.3 13.2 17.6 29.5  9.2  20.4 35.4 n.a. 23.6  36.0 
Money plus quasi 
Money 
57.5 26.9 31.1 39.1 19.5 25.9 45.1 n.a. 32.0  68.6 
Domestic  credit  32.7 34.6 19.1 45.9 21.2 18.8 41.8 n.a. 28.1  134.1 
Credit to the 
Private Sector 
3.6  30.7 14.9 36.9 22.5  8.5  34.7 n.a. 20.1  102.2 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 
(1)  Data source for Bosnia H. is national authorities; Bosnia H. is therefore excluded from SEE-8 Total. 
(2)  Quasi Money = Time, savings and foreign currency deposits of residents other than Central Government. 
 
The monetization of the economy is, on average, very far from the EU standards; only Albania and 
Slovenia, as far as the broad money indicator, can be regarded almost in line with the European 
average. Looking at domestic credit, and even more to the credit to the private sector, a striking 
difference emerges. Relative to GDP, the SEE-8 financial system provides only 1/5 of the credit 
provided by its European analogue. The ratio for credit to the private sector stands at only 20 per cent 
of GDP, against over 100 per cent in Europe, and in some countries, such as Albania and Romania, 
this indicator does not reach the two digit level. 
2. During the 1990s all countries of the region have experienced problems arising from 
the very poor quality of banks’ credit portfolio. Political pressure on banks to soften 
budget constraints on large loss-making enterprises, reluctance or inability of 
banking regulators to liquidate troubled banks, ineffective legal frameworks for 
creditors’ rights have all contributed to widespread bad loan problems at the 
beginning of the transition process. Even though most countries have adopted 
measures to clean up banks’ balance sheets few have succeeded in establishing an 
effective environment for safe banking activities. Comprehensive action for the 
resolution of bad debt problems was taken in Slovenia in the mid-1990s and since   11  
then the banking system has shown a decline in non-performing loans which at mid-
2000 accounted for 5.2 per cent of total assets, the lowest level in the region. The 
Bulgarian experience is different in that only after the deep financial turmoil of 1996 
more severe criteria have been introduced leading banks to more conservative 
lending attitudes. This has led to an impressive improvement in portfolio quality 
even though operating in highly risky environment. Problems of credit quality are 
still huge in Romania owing to delays in the reform process. 
3. An efficient payment system is one of the main strategic services that the banking 
system can offer to foster economic development. SEE-8 countries started from a 
structure of the payment system that was suited to the functioning of a planned 
economy. Usually all payment transactions were performed by a central agency and 
enterprises were obliged to keep an account with this agency in order to regulate 
international transactions. The transfer of these accounts from the central agency to 
commercial banks is the main step in reforming the payment system. This step 
requires substantial changes of the infrastructure related to the payment system and 
the acquisition of the necessary expertise by commercial banks. The standard 
prevailing in the European payment systems is the benchmark for the reform efforts. 
In the less developed SEE-8 countries cash is still widely used in many transactions 
given the limited circulation of credit cards and other cashless forms of payment. 
However, some reforms should be carried out by end-2001. These efforts are actively 
supported by Western central banks and IFIs with technical assistance programs.  
4.  It is still not easy to fully understand the actual compliance with the legal framework 
governing banking and financial activities. According to a EBRD survey conducted 
in 1998 among lawyers and other specialists working in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the CIS countries the legal setting of banking operations is quite advanced in 
those countries that experienced a banking crisis. However the enforcement of laws 
and regulations governing banking and capital markets lags far behind the 
extensiveness of these laws. This is partly due to ineffective legal institutions; 
problems in drafting rules and codes attached to these laws; lack of trained 
supervisory personnel; lack of sufficient funding. In this field, which has a direct 
bearing on the prevention of financial crisis, the World Bank and the Fund are 
engaged in an ongoing Financial Assessment Program. This program involves many 
national and international standard setting bodies, such as IOSCO and IAIS, and is 
aimed at assessing financial sector vulnerability.   12  
 
3.2 Non-bank financial markets and intermediaries 
Non-bank sectors play a marginal role in SEE-8 countries. In the most advanced 
economy under review, Slovenia, the total balance sheet of non-monetary financial 
institutions does not exceed half of that of credit institutions; in other countries this 
share is far smaller if not negligible. All SEE-8 countries have in place the basic laws, 
rules and infrastructures needed to run an equity market. The only exception is Bosnia 
and Herzegovina which, still at the beginning of the privatisation process, has not yet set 
up organised capital markets, a pre-requisite for a successful implementation of 
privatisation plans based on voucher schemes. However, both the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Parliaments passed a set of capital market laws and a Securities 
Commission has been established. According to these laws, any issuer must submit a 
report of a completed private placement to the Securities Commission. By December 
2000, ten issues had been reported.  
Besides a fairly common legal framework, the deepness and performance of 
capital markets greatly differ among SEE-8 countries. In the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania trading is negligible in organised markets and the 
overwhelming activity is placed on OTC markets. The Tirana Stock Exchange, 
established as a department of the National Central Bank, quotes only treasury bills and 
government bonds; in Yugoslavia FR stockholding has been abandoned, owing to a 
virtually non-existent system of property rights. In Slovenia and in Croatia, at the end of 
1999 total market capitalisation reached 25.3 and 13.4 per cent of GDP respectively. In 
Slovenia the share of official market in total capitalisation is larger than that of OTC 
market (69 against 31 per cent). Equity markets in the SEE-8 region suffer, in general, 
from imbalances between supply and demand which stem from privatisation 
procedures. These procedures, which focused on the primary distribution of shares to 
eligible groups of owners, are responsible for imbalances between few buyers and many 
sellers. Compared to other privatisation methods, voucher schemes are faster, simpler 
and politically appealing. In many circumstances voucher privatisation is the only 
feasible choice but has some drawbacks: it does not really contribute to modify 
households’ approach to saving and investment; it creates a dispersed ownership which 
prevents an effective control on management and radical shifts in corporate governance. 
On the demand side of equity markets, privatisation failed to play a catalytic role and   13  
household equity investments are still limited. Although basic standards in the 
institutional and regulatory settings are already in place, additional reform efforts are 
needed in some countries in order to improve the efficiency and to deepen capital 
markets. In particular priority should be given to the improvement of financial 
information, the strengthening of surveillance and monitoring activities, the 
enhancement of efficiency in order to lower costs and increase safety of transactions.  
3.3 Privatisation in the banking system  
In all countries of the region privatisation has mostly been concentrated on 
enterprises while bank privatisation has been held back until the end of the 1990s. Bank 
privatisation has long been delayed even though with sharp differences in terms of 
financial restructuring and stability of the banking sector. Slovenia adopted a centralised 
approach to banking reform but imposed early on hard budget constraints on State 
banks. The country’s banking system has thus experienced a rather smooth transition 
without addressing the problem of excessive state ownership, which at the end of 1999 
still accounted for 49 per cent of total banks’ assets. Only recently the Government has 
adopted a plan for the gradual privatisation of Nova Ljubljanska Banka, the largest State 
bank.  
Delays in privatisation have also characterised the reform of the banking industry 
in Bulgaria and Romania, hampering restructuring while State banks have long been a 
source of systemic instability. Both countries have only recently put privatisation on 
agenda for banking sector reform and major progress is expected by 2001. 
Privatisation in Croatia occurred primarily in response to the two crises which 
have hit the banking system in the last decade. Following the first crisis of the mid-
1990s the largest bank, Zagreb Banka, was privatised while the privatisation of the other 
State-owned banks was postponed, notwithstanding previous commitments. The 
privatisation process has made substantial progress in recent years as a part of a vast 
restructuring program adopted following the second banking crisis. At the end of 1999 a 
majority stake of Privredna Banka, the largest State-owned bank, has been sold to 
Banca Commerciale Italiana while Unicredito has acquired the control of the second 
largest, Splitska and a relevant participation in the Zagrebacka Group in 2000. With 
these operations Italian banks are controlling over 50 per cent of the Croatian banking 
system. Compared to other countries of the region bank privatisation in FYR Macedonia 
has proceeded quite rapidly even though the outcome in terms of financial restructuring   14  
and economic performance of the banking industry has been below expectations. Bank 
privatisation has followed the privatisation of the existing shareholders, mainly former 
socially owned enterprises and at the end of 1999 about 80 per cent of banking capital 
was privatised. However the distinctive feature in the privatizaton process, which has 
left unchanged ownership structures and management, has secured the perpetuation of 
previous lending patterns and links. 
In Albania the process for the privatisation of the two dominant State banks, 
accounting for 82.4 per cent of total banking assets as of end June 1999, was initiated in 
1998 and is still underway. In the first half of 2000 the authorities signed an agreement 
with foreign investors on the privatisation of the second largest bank, while the 
privatisation of the more economically significant Saving Bank in expected by end 
2001. 
4. Banking crises in the Balkans: determinants, resolutions and lessons 
The credit system plays a central role in the transition process by virtue of its 
provision and allocation of funds to enterprises, possibly at a low cost.  
Macroeconomic analysis generally focuses on the overall constraints represented 
by often large budget deficits in a context of low saving rates and restrictive monetary 
policy crowding out private investment, while micro-analysis points to the critical role 
of firm-level differences among countries: scarcity of production factors (human capital 
or equity), governance problems, weak property rights and information asymmetries. A 
different approach emphasizes the system dimension of the transition process in the 
banking sector, defined as the passage from a centralised state-supervised mechanism of 
resource allocation to a decentralised one whose function is characterised by tight 
microeconomic solvency constraints.  
In recent years a few major episodes of banking and financial crisis beset the 
Balkans: the rise and fall of the pyramid scheme in Albania in 1996-97 and the banking 
crises in Bulgaria leading to two waves of bankruptcies, respectively in May and 
September 1996. Croatia also has recently experienced the crisis of single banks that 
spilled over to the overall  financial system. 
We further examine each of the episodes shading some light on the determinants 
of the crises, the solution adopted by the monetary authorities to solve them and the 
lessons that can be drawn from these episodes.   15  
 
4.1 Albania: the crisis of the “pyramid” financial intermediaries 
The “pyramid” scheme phenomenon in Albania was important because its scale 
relative to the size of the economy was unprecedented, and because the political and 
social consequences of the collapse of the pyramid scheme were deep. At their peak, the 
nominal value of the pyramid scheme liabilities amounted to almost half of the 
country’s GDP. When the scheme collapsed, there was uncontained rioting, the 
government fell, and the country descended into anarchy and a near civil war in which 
some two thousand people were killed. Despite the tremendous political effect, 
however, the economic effects of the pyramid scheme phenomenon in Albania have 
been surprisingly limited. 
Pyramid schemes have been prominent in transition economies in recent years 
(MMM in Russia, Caritas in Romania and smaller schemes in Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic), but they also exist in industrial countries. The reasons why they do not come 
to public attention are better law enforcement and maybe a great consciousness in 
distinguishing between a credible and an incredible rate of return. Some of the 
conditions that led to the success of a pyramid scheme in Albania are common to other 
parts of the world: an inadequate banking system, an unclear legal system, lack of 
governance, a population in poverty aware of, and attracted by, the behavior of 
wealthier countries (e.g. Italy), and so more vulnerable to the unlikely promise of 
pyramid scheme operators. 
4.2 Bulgaria: the banking crisis in 1996 
The banking crisis in Bulgaria had its antecedents and underpinnings in the fact 
that in the period 1990-95 practically no decisive transition to a market-oriented 
economy was achieved. State monopolies in the area of machine engineering, 
chemistry, the energy sector, transport and communications were not restructured, the 
privatization process was marginal, and the newly emerging private sector – insufficient 
and ineffective. 
In mid-1995, 75 per cent of about 5,500 enterprises operating within the Bulgarian 
national economy officially reported a loss from their operations, and the loss 
approximated 20 per cent of GDP. It is particularly indicative that for 1,100 of them 
their proceeds could not cover their expenses for materials and energy consumption,   16  
while more than 2,000 of them were not able to provide the funds to cover their salary 
expenses. At the end of 1995, only one fifth of the enterprises reported a positive result 
of their operations. The genesis of the banking system after 1990, the forms and stages 
of introduction of prudential regulations, and the behaviour of the institutions inevitably 
paved the way to a deep banking crisis. 
4.3 Croatia: the two waves of banking crisis (1996, 1998) 
In the last decade the Croatian banking system experienced two crises. Compared 
to the ones described above, the Croatian crisis happened in a less turbulent way, and 
was confronted appropriately by national authorities, without a deep involvement of 
international financial institutions and within a favourable environment of political 
stability. 
The first wave of the crisis happened in 1996, due to the misbehavior of the previous political 
regime and amplified by the weak supervisory legal framework and supervisory authorities’ lack of 
expertise in timely recognizing the symptoms and adequately managing a banking crisis. The reforms in 
the banking system had been  formal and had not changed incorrect business practices: several state-
owned banks still received financial support, privatization often preserved the management unchanged 
while links between enterprises and banks were very profound. Four of the six largest banks were 
insolvent and needed to be recapitalised with an injection of public resources for an estimated social cost 
that amounted to 22 per cent of the 1997 GDP. The second crisis began in March 1998 and led to the 
insolvency of the fifth largest bank and the consequent failure of a number of small and medium-size 
institutions. The crises involved around 12 per cent of total bank assets, while the rehabilitation cost 
amounted to 5 per cent of GDP. 
The costs of the financial rehabilitation of banks and the paying out of the insured deposits place 
Croatia amongst the countries with the highest outlays for solving bank problems (the total amount of 
public outlays for the rehabilitation of banks being estimated up to date at 31 per cent of GDP). 
Until the mid-1980s, commercial banks in Croatia were under the control of their funding 
enterprises and their basic objective was to lend financial resources to their founders at the cheapest 
possible rate. From the beginning of the 1990s, a so called linear-rehabilitation process of reform of 
commercial banking was undertaken, even if it did not modify banks’ attitude to lend money primarily to 
the respective founder enterprises. That fact led to a progressive deterioration of the banks’ balance sheet 
that forced the government in 1996 to rehabilitate three large banks, transferring the bad bank credits to 
a special agency, recapitalizing the intermediaries and replacing shareholders and bank management. 
After this rehabilitation there was a large drop in interest rates that led, in 1998, to a new bank crisis that 
mainly hit new banks which had highly aggressive, and someway inappropriate, interest rate policies, 
exacerbated by external shocks. The intervention of the CNB has been speedy after the crisis began but 
probably not as prompt as it should have been. Although many banks failed, there are still many 
weaknesses, especially connected with currency and credit risks in many banks’ balance sheets, bank 
involvement in enterprise shares, mismatch in asset and liability management, lack of full compliance 
with the best international practices in banking supervision. 
4.4 Lessons from the crises 
Based on the above analysis, we can draw a general conclusion: if we do not 
consider the political and social consequences (as in the case of Albania) and apart from 
the distributional effects and the high fiscal costs in terms of GDP that the rehabilitation 
of the concerned intermediaries have often implied, the banking crises in the Balkans   17  
did not have particularly heavy macroeconomic consequences, especially for growth. 
Some other tentative lessons can be drawn. 
1. The lack or delay of reforms in the real economy allows a transfer of losses to the 
banking system, and consequently intensifies the decapitalization processes in it. 
2. Measures that are uncoordinated and insufficient in scope and depth may alleviate 
only temporarily the pressures in the system, but not prevent the crisis. 
3. The resolution of the crisis requires a strong political will and coordination between 
various centres of power and resources. 
4. The period for recovering confidence in the banking system is long and during it the 
operations of Banking Supervision gain particular significance. 
5. Very often bank and financial crises originate from an unstable political and 
economic situation and the recovery is highly conditioned by the timing and the 
pattern of the political stabilization process. 
Some critical episodes, as the rise and fall of the pyramid schemes in Albania, 
suggest that to prevent negative consequences, there are some steps a government, as 
well as the international financial institutions, should follow. 
A. National authorities should supervise both formal and informal financial markets. In 
Albania the latter was out of the control of public authorities: the National Bank 
began to take notice of it at the end of 1995, at about the time the escalation of the 
pyramid schemes began. The time delay between recognizing the potential danger of 
crisis and being prepared to put in place the required corrective actions is usually 
very long: an early awareness of the potential problems and the predisposition of the 
proper instruments of intervention are thus necessary. 
B. International financial institutions should learn something from an episode like the 
Albanian crisis: they should have foreseen earlier the incoming crisis and warned the 
government more decisively, although we recognize the fact that their task is not to 
investigate the solvency of single intermediaries, especially when these 
intermediaries are suspected to pursue criminal activity, and they have no power of 
direct intervention in what can be considered an internal political matter.    18    19  
COUNTRY PROFILE: ALBANIA 
∗   
1.  Economic structure and transition process 
During its transition to a market economy Albania has experienced wide swings in economic 
performance. As in many post-socialist countries, output sharply declined at the beginning of the transition 
with a cumulative contraction of GDP of nearly 40 per cent between 1989 and 1992 when a wide-ranging 
macroeconomic stabilisation and reform program was introduced with the assistance of the IMF and foreign 
financial aid. Tight fiscal and monetary policies helped to reduce the inflation rate from 211 per cent in 1992 
to 6 per cent in 1995 while in the same years the general government deficit was cut from 21 per cent of 
GDP to 10.2 per cent. Price and quantitative trade controls were removed and in July 1992 the Lek was made 
convertible. Owing to rapid progress in the privatisation of agriculture, which still accounts for about half of 
the country GDP, the share of private sector to GDP rose to 50 per cent in 1994 from 5 per cent in 1991. A 
strong economic recovery started in 1993 and lasted until 1996, with real GDP growth averaging close to 10 
per cent per year. Following the collapse of that “pyramid” scheme and the resulting civil unrest in the first 
half of 1997 the country plunged into a deep economic recession. Strong adjustment measures were adopted 
to restore economic stability and the economy rebounded in the second half of the year. The economic 
contraction for the full year amounted to 7 per cent while inflation increased to 42. In 1998 the authorities 
maintained a tight fiscal and monetary policy stance taming inflation, which fell to 9 per cent, and stabilising 
the exchange rate while growth accelerated markedly to 8 per cent. Growth remained too strong during 1999, 
despite the impact of the Kosovo crisis in the first half of the year; GDP increased to 7 per cent while 
inflation turned negative following a sharp appreciation of the Lek.  
2. Institutional  aspects 
2.1 Legal framework of banking activities 
A market-oriented legal framework was introduced in 1992 with the enactment of the law On the Bank 
of Albania and the law On Banking System which transformed the banking system from a centrally planned 
single tier into a two-level system. After the outbreak of the pyramid schemes the banking law was amended 
to strengthen prudential regulation, improve the supervisory powers of the Bank of Albania (BoA) and 
prevent the creation of pyramid schemes. The new Law On Banks enacted in July 1998 provides BoA with 
broad regulatory powers to set base capital and capital requirements and prudential rules concerning credit 
exposure to single debtors and related party lending. Following the enactment of the new Law BoA has thus 
set a prudential regulation broadly in line with Basle Core Principles, even though some Principles appear to 
be met in a rather formal way. Moreover significant weaknesses remain in effective supervision and 
regulatory enforcement. 
2.2 The structure of the banking system and financial system 
As of end-1999 the banking system consisted of 9 banks and 3 foreign bank branches. Considering the 
foreign branches, in 9 banks private shareholders held a majority stake even though the two largest banks 
were state owned. Eight banks were controlled by foreign investors, five of which were totally owned, one 
was a joint-venture between the state owned National Commercial Bank (NCB) and Banca di Roma with a 
minority participation of EBRD and another was a joint venture between NCB and a consortium of Arab 
banks holding a majority share. Both state banks were put under governance contract in 1998 in preparation 
for their privatisation. In the first half of 2000 the authorities signed an agreement with foreign investors on 
the privatisation of NCB while progress in the process of privatising the more economically significant 
Saving Bank has been limited. The Tirana stock Exchange was established in May 1996 as a department of 
BoA but since then trading has been negligible and limited to treasury bills and government bonds.  
 
 
2.3 Monetary policy 
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The main objective of the Bank of Albania is achieve price stability and, subordinate to the primary 
goal, to promote conditions conducive to balanced and sustained economic growth. BoA independence in 
formulating and implementing the monetary policy is enshrined in the Constitution. The BoA has opted for a 
monetary policy targeting and has largely relied on direct instruments of monetary control, mainly credit 
ceilings and floors on interest rates on deposits collected by state-owned banks. However the Bank is 
currently phasing out instruments of direct monetary control. Bank-by-bank credit ceilings were removed in 
November 1999 while minimum deposit rates will been maintained until the completion of state-owned 
banks privatisation.  
3.  The banking system structure and performance 
3.1 Transition process in the banking system 
The Albanian financial sector underwent a major crisis in 1997 with the collapse of the pyramid 
schemes. Since the beginning of transition an informal financial sector composed of companies taking 
deposits and making loans had flourished. These money-borrowing firms exploited loopholes in the legal 
framework and they had never been licensed to take deposit. Some of them begun early to run pyramid 
schemes, collecting deposits promising artificial high returns to customers which were paid out of newly 
attracted money. It is estimated that at their utmost, at the end of 1996, the pyramid schemes’ liabilities 
amounted at 1.2 billions U.S. dollar, equivalent to 50 per cent of the annual gross domestic product. The 
outbreak of the pyramid schemes in early 1997 plunged the country into a deep crises, with civil unrest and 
riots while economic activities stalled and the Lek depreciated sharply. In July 1997 a special law for the 
winding up of the companies running the schemes was enacted and foreign administrator were appointed to 
liquidate them. The growth and collapse of the pyramid schemes had little impact on the banking system. A 
massive fall in deposits in the course 1997, owing to a partial seizure of the assets of the two largest schemes 
and withdrawals by owners, was reversed later in the year as confidence in the banking system was restored 
and individuals shift from cash holding to time deposit in Lek. Following the crisis the authorities adopted 
measures to strengthen the financial sector and to enhance the role of the private sector in the banking 
system. The operation of the smallest of the three state owned banks, the Rural Commercial Bank, were 
suspended at the end of 1997 and the bank was liquidated in 1998. The process for the privatisation of the 
remaining state banks was initiated and is still underway. Foreign administrators were appointed to 
streamline operations of the two banks which were also prohibited for prudential purposes from expanding 
net credit as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans exceeded the legal limit of 20 per cent. 
3.2 Development indicators and market structure 
The banking system is fairly underdeveloped and inefficient and an informal financial sector still plays 
an important role. Even though domestic credit represented the 45.3 per cent of GDP at the end of 1999 
credit provided by the banking system to the private sector is small reprensentig only the 3.3 per cent of 
GDP. The system is highly concentrated and dominated by the two state owned banks whose share in total 
banks’ assets was 82.4 per cent as of end-June 1999, with the Saving Bank, the country’s largest bank, 
owning 67.1 per cent of total assets. State banks have invested disproportionately in government bonds and 
having also being subject to strict prudential limits imposed on lending they have not performed an effective 
financial intermediation towards the private sector. At end-June 1999 the Saving Bank alone collected 75.6 
per cent of total bank deposits and enjoyed a near monopoly position in the T-bill markets, with the share of 
96.4 per cent of total banking system, while loans represented only the 11.5 per cent of its assets. On the 
other end private banks have so far showed a low propensity to extend credit to the private sector largely 
focusing on trade-financing and fees generating activities.  
3.3 Risks and efficiency 
Credit quality is poor. As of end-1999 54 per cent of total loans to public non financial enterprises and 
to private sector were classified as doubtful with a slight improvement from the 60 per cent at end-1998. 
Loan collection rates of the state-owned banks are very low. At end-December 1999 the weighted short-term 
(one year) lending rate was 25.8 per cent while weighted short- term deposit rate was 9.1 per cent. Despite 
nominal high interest margins the profitability is weak and at the end of 1999 the Return on Assets amounted 
to 1 per cent for the total the banking system and close to zero in the two state owned banks.   21  
 
 
Albania: Main Economic Indicators 
 
 
    1997 1998 1999 
      
Population (mid-year estimation)(a)  3,324.3  3,354.3  3,387.8 
Exchange rate (end of year)     
 - Lek per 1 U.S. dollar  149.0  140.1  135.3 
 - Lek per 1 DM  83.8  84.0  69.9 
Gross Domestic Product     
 - current market price (million of Lek)(a)  341,716  460,631  506,205 
 - current market price (million of U.S. dollar)(a)  2,294  3,058  3,676 
 - growth rate (real Lek)(a)  -7.0  8.0  7.3 
 - per capita (in U.S. dollars)(a)  690.2  911.6  1.121.1 
Current account      
 - Current account balance - excluding official transfers 
(in percent of GDP)(a) 
-14.4 -8.2 -9.3 
Unemployment rate(a)  14.9 17.8 18.0 
External debt (in percent of GDP)(a)  35.6 26.5 25.4 
Reserves (in million of U.S. dollar)(a)  308.3 384.2 481.6 
Consumer prices (annual average)(a)  42.1 8.7  -1.0 
Overall Budget balance(in percent of GDP)(a)  -13.0 -10.4 -11.0 
M1 (millions of Lek)(a)  91,667 83.728  103,004 
 - in percent of GDP(a)  26.8  18.2  20.3 
M2 (million of Lek)(a)  162,221 199,263 239,662 
 - in percent of GDP(a)  47.5  43.3  47.3 
M3 (million of Lek)(a)  198,547 239,526 292,871 
 - in percent of GDP(a)  58.1  52.0  57.9 
Domestic credit (in million of Lek)   180,306 207,937 229,324 
 - in percent of GDP(a)  52.8  45.1  45.3 
Credit to the private sector  12,955 13,485 16,841 
 - in percent of GDP(a)  3.8  2.9  3.3 
Banks' Assets  180,936 207,708 246,798 
 - in percent of GDP(a)  52.9  45.1  48.8 
Source: National Authorities (a) and IMF (b). 
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1. The economic structure 
1.1 Economic background (1995-98) 
After the end of the war in Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement (December 1995) gave birth to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BH) as a highly decentralised state, consisting of two Entities: the Muslim-Croat “Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (FBH) and the Serbian “Republika Srpska” (RS); the Federation itself is rather 
decentralised, consisting of ten “cantons”. The war in Bosnia had lasted for three years, from 1992 to 1995. 
Human casualties, expulsions and flight have reduced the country’s population by one quarter; the World 
Bank estimates that about 15 billions of USD worth of capital stock was destroyed during the war. The 
Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBH) was founded in August 1997. The national currency, 
named “konvertibilna marka” (KM), was introduced in the summer of the following year. The KM is linked 
to the Deutsche Mark on the basis of a currency board arrangement. The fixed exchange rate is 1 KM for 1 
DM.  
In 1995 the GDP of BH had dropped to a quarter of its pre-war level. Between 1995 and 1998, the 
GDP average annual rate of growth was 33 per cent; the unemployment rate in the Federation fell from 70-
80 per cent to under 40, while the RS achieved milder results. The monetary authorities appear to have 
subdued inflation: in 1999 the CPI in the Federation was equal to 0 (see Table 1), whereas in the RS the 
reduced circulation of the KM, in favour of Yugoslav dinar, hindered price control. In 1998 the consolidated 
(general government and Entities) budget deficit was at 3 per cent of GDP, and it was completely financed 
from abroad. Economic development in BH was fuelled by trade, construction and services, as well as large 
capital inflows. Trade deficits were covered by financial assistance, transfers, and accumulation of arrears.  
1.2 Recent developments (1999-2000) 
Notwithstanding the negative effects produced by the conflict over Kosovo (Yugoslavia is the major 
trading partner of BH), the Bosnian real GDP rose by 9 per cent in 1999, and it is estimated to have increased 
by 10 per cent in 2000, despite a severe drought which should have reduced output in agriculture by 15 per 
cent. In 2000, industrial production growth, which had slowed down in the previous year, has shown a 
substantial recovery in the RS and a slight deceleration in the FBH.  
Both Entities have experienced great difficulties in implementing the approved budgets for 2000; these 
difficulties are the result of unexpected wage increases, larger transfers to the pension fund in RS, the effects 
on foreign debt service of the depreciation of KM against the USD, and higher spending on refugees. The 
financing gaps for 2000 reached 125 millions KM in the FBH (preliminary data available only for the federal 
authorities), and 53 millions KM in the RS; foreign donations reduced the gap in the FBH to 64 millions 
KM, and balanced the budget in the RS. 
In 1999, broad money rose by 40 per cent, as a result of the marked increase in the demand for 
domestic currency at the expense of foreign currencies (Table 2). In 2000, the growth rate slowed down to 16 
per cent, as this portfolio adjustment should have been neared completion. Private sector credit has grown 
less than the increase in nominal GDP, probably still reflecting weaknesses in the legal and institutional 
environment, and banks’ difficulties to provide financial services.  
Current account deficits have remained large (-4,351 millions KM in 2000), and foreign assistance is 
pivotal in supporting the balance of payments. 
 
 
2. Institutional aspects 
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2.1 Legal framework of banking and financial activities 
The central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has got very limited powers: the State is in charge 
of foreign policy, foreign trade and customs policy, monetary and exchange rate policy, foreign debt, 
domestic and international communications. All duties not explicitly vested with the central government fall 
within the powers of the two Entities. Thus, the Entities are in charge of bank privatisation, bank supervision, 
and more in general of economic and development policies. The natural inclination of Serb and Croat ethnic 
groups to seek special ties with Serbia and Croatia respectively, has sometimes obliged authorities (first of 
all the High Representative 
2) to impose a uniform legislation, as economic and legislative integration 
between the two Entities is a key issue for the economic development of BH. 
Pre-war banking structure of BH was the same as in the rest of Yugoslavia: banks were founded by 
enterprises, and banks lent heavily to their owners. They were, as a matter of fact, captive companies. The 
primary steps for a reform of the financial system have been: 1) the foundation of a banks’ regulatory 
legislation; 2) the liquidation of insolvent banks and the privatisation of all other state-owned banks; 3) the 
enhancement of bank supervision; 4) the establishment of deposit insurance mechanisms; 5) the phased 
elimination of the Payments Bureaux. 
Both Entities have issued their new commercial bank laws, defining the authority of the Entities 
Banking Supervision Agencies. These laws establish general operational requirements for banks, define 
permissible activities and prohibited transactions, include insolvency definitions, the conditions under which 
a provisional administrator may be appointed by the Agencies, his powers and duties, and a defined 
receivership role. They also permit deposit and investment banking, and establish a priority of claims in the 
liquidation process; finally, they establish general criteria for the disposition of banks’ assets and liabilities, 
and for bank sales or mergers.  
Banking, financial and payment systems supervision authorities are the Central Bank, the Banking 
Agencies, the Ministries of Finance, the Payments Bureaux, the Bank Privatisation Units, the Securities 
Commissions. The Banking Agencies have made progress in enforcing regular reporting of financial data by 
banks and in training staff to use off-site supervision. However, many important issues remain to be 
resolved: conservatorship powers, bank enforcement authority, off-site supervision capabilities, bank 
accounting standards, establishment of an integrated supervisory approach, licensing procedures, agency 
enforcement authority. In May, 2000, the High Representative simultaneously amended the banking laws in 
both Entities: they did not provide protection for bank supervisors, examiners and officials of the Banking 
Agencies from personal liabilities arising from the normal performance of their duties. Protection of this type 
of officials is both customary and necessary for strong and independent bank supervision, as stated by the 
Basle Committee. 
Past financial history of BH has instilled a widespread reluctance to place deposits in banks
3. A 
deposit insurance is needed. The Federation amended the Law on Deposit Insurance in April 2000, providing 
for the proper legal framework to set up a system for securing deposits. The Federation Deposit Insurance 
Agency has been formed, whereas a RS Agency has not yet been established. The RS Government withdrew 
the Proposals on Deposit Insurance and the Law on Payments Transactions from the Agenda of RS National 
Assembly Session, held on October 17
th, 2000, and it is still expected to establish a system of deposit 
insurance.  
In order to implement the bank privatisation process, each Entity established a Bank Privatisation Unit 
(BPU). The initial step was the issuance of the Laws on Opening Balance Sheets (OBS): they established the 
basis for determining banks’ solvency, and determined which assets and liabilities would be removed. Banks 
whose OBS show a higher value of active assets than liabilities are considered solvent; they prepare 
privatisation plans and, after approval from the Entity government, they enter into the privatisation stage. 
Insolvent banks would be liquidated or merged. Both Entities have adopted laws on the sale or liquidation of 
commercial banks in public ownership. In 1998 the High Representative had issued the Framework Law on 
Privatisation of Enterprises and Banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This law had recognised the right of the 
                                                           
2 The Dayton peace agreement designated a High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects 
of the peace agreement on behalf on the international community. 
3 Experts estimate that 450 millions of KM are lying “under the mattresses” in BH, reflecting the lack of trust in the 
banking system and the limited role that the banks are playing in economic revival.   24  
Entities to privatise enterprises and banks and to dispose of the privatisation proceeds, and it had established 
the privatisation process principles of non-discrimination amongst beneficiaries of claims, transparency, and 
public accountability.  
With the issuance of privatisation claims in the Federation and privatisation vouchers in the RS, 
mechanisms were required to allow citizens to transfer and trade their claims and vouchers through an 
organised capital market; a comprehensive set of capital market laws has been passed by parliaments in both 
Entities (Law on Securities; Law on Security Commissions; Law on Registrar of Securities; Law on 
Management Companies and Investment Funds).  
The Federation Securities Commission is an independent institution established by the 1999 Law on 
Securities Commission;  the Commission regulates, approves and supervises the issuance and trading of 
securities in the Federation. A minimal amount of registered capital is prescribed for professional 
intermediaries (brokerage and dealing houses). The Commission has defined the obligatory elements of the 
contracts between professional intermediaries and their customers, and the performance of broker business 
operations; take-overs and tender offers have also been regulated. 
The process of dismantling and liquidating the Payments Bureaux is a key issue for the banking 
system development. It must be overseen by a Governing Board in both Entities. The new Law takes away 
the monopoly position of the Payment Bureaux over domestic payment transactions, and provides a legal 
basis for a governing board to guarantee transparency in the transformation process. A team of experts has 
developed a strategic plan for transfer of the functions of the Payments Bureaux to the appropriate 
governmental institutions and to the banking system. Commercial banks need to acquire licenses before they 
are allowed to perform payment transactions. The legal framework of the Payments Bureaux’ transformation 
has been recently completed by the High Representative through the issuance of a set of laws and 
amendments; the new payment system began operations on January 5
th, 2001. 
2.2 Monetary policy 
The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the sole authority for the issuing of currency and 
monetary policy implementation. The chief body of the Central Bank is the Governing Board, consisting of 
three members (two from the FBH, and one from the RS), and the Governor.  
At the moment of establishment of CBBH, Bosnia and Herzegovina was experiencing both asset and 
currency substitution
4. Since high currency and asset substitutions typically cause high volatility in the 
velocity of money supply, the monetary authorities decided to pursue a Currency Board Rule, tying the KM 
unit to one DM. Moreover, the Law on the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina requires that the 
aggregate amount of the monetary liabilities of Central Bank shall at no time exceed its net foreign exchange 
reserves, in order to increase its credibility. 
So far, the CBBH has pursued two main results: 
1)  the maintenance of stability of the domestic currency (KM) has assured a full coverage of the CBBH 
monetary liabilities through its foreign assets (official foreign reserves); a stable value of the domestic 
currency and the adherence to the Currency Board have in this way a direct influence on inflation within 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
2)  the most significant result in 1999 was the removal of foreign currencies from the domestic non-cash 
payment system, as well as a reduction of their use for cash transactions. As a result, during 1999 the 
foreign reserves held within the CBBH and the commercial banks increased steeply, improving the 
credibility of the BH banking system abroad (Tables 3-4). 
3. The financial system 
3.1 The structure of the banking and financial systems 
                                                           
4 Currency substitution occurs when assets denominated in foreign currency are used as means of payment, while asset 
substitution occurs when assets denominated in foreign currency serve as store of value. The ratios (in percent) of 
foreign currency deposits to M1 and M2 can be good indicators for currency and asset substitution rates, respectively.    25  
Banks. On December 31
st, 2000, 57 banks in BH had work permits; out of them, 38 banks were 
operational in the Federation, 18 banks and one postal savings bank in the RS.  
Public confidence in the banking sector is low. Pre-war foreign exchange deposits have been frozen 
and replaced only partially with vouchers, therefore the major source of funds for banks are foreign credit 
lines. Banks derive over 50 per cent of their income from transfer fees (only abroad) and by leasing their 
premises. Despite considerable interest rate margins, low lending activities keep interest income low.  
BH banks have very limited resources for new lending; savings were wiped out as a result of inflation 
and the freezing of foreign currency deposits (nominal claims of about 3 billion DM from depositors in 
Federation banks and about 1.2 billion DM from depositors in RS banks). There are additional reasons for 
public reluctance to place deposits in banks: first of all, the lack of services provided by most of them; the 
existence of the Payments Bureaux has been another factor stultifying the development of the banking 
industry. There remains a complete absence of long-term investment capital, despite the fact that capital 
demand is strong, and potential and profitable projects are numerous.  
The banking market is still highly concentrated, despite the fact that several private banks have been 
set up after the war: 11 state owned banks control around three-quarters of total banking assets in the 
Federation, while in the RS the 4 largest public owned banks control two-thirds of all assets. A total of 17 
banks (10 in the Federation, 7 in the RS) are mainly or entirely state-owned. 
The RS has caught up with the Federation, as far as the privatisation process is concerned. All state 
owned banks have been declared solvent on the basis of their opening balance sheets, and five of them have 
been offered for sale. The fourth tender, published on August 21
st, 2000, for the sale of state shares in 
Agroprom Bank has ended successfully, increasing the percentage of private capital in this bank to 51,2%. 
Negotiations are ongoing for the sale of the state-owned 90% in Privredna Banka, Doboj. There are several 
national and international bidders for the sale of Kristal Bank, published on October 23
rd. However, the sales 
of the state capital in Privredna Banka, Srpsko Sarajevo, and in Banjaluca Banka, Banja Luka have been 
unsuccessful. 
In the Federation, an agreement was reached in December, 2000, with the holder of the Czech 
creditor’s position in the Privedna Banks related group: Privredna Banka Sarajevo, Central Profit Banka, 
Una Banka Bihac, Gospodarska Banka and Travnicka Banka Travnik. All or part of these banks will be 
tendered for privatisation; banks or portions not privatised by June 30
th,  2001, are to go into liquidation. 
Two Privedna Banka Sarajevo-related banks that have already self-privatised need external investors in order 
to be competitive. Postbank BiH and Sipad Banka have been tendered, and a tender offer on Union Banka is 
projected. 
At the end of 2000 total assets of BH commercial banks amounted to 4,358 million KM, averaging an 
annualised growth rate of 9.2 per cent from the end of 1997. In terms of GDP, however, in 1999 they fell 
from 48.8 to 47.5 per cent: foreign assets remained roughly constant (from 8.7 to 9 per cent), claims on 
government almost halved (from 1.7 to 0.9 per cent), whereas those on non financial enterprises and on 
private sector passed from 35.3 to 34.5 per cent. In 1999, the claims on households amounted to only 3.3 of 
GDP, those on industrial enterprises to 31.4 per cent. In recent years the share of short-term credits has 
equalled to 30-35 per cent; although the share of claims on household is just a fraction of those on 
enterprises, it is growing in importance (Figures 1-3). 
Although a Turkish state owned bank has been operating since 1997, only now the foreign 
participation in the Bosnian banking sector is rapidly increasing. In August, 2000,  the privately owned 
Market Banka was taken over by the Austrian Raiffeisen Zentralbank. In July 2000, another Austrian 
intermediary, Volksbank, was the first EU bank to open a subsidiary, the Volksbank Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; it was followed by the opening of branches of the Österreichische Volksbanken in the 
Federation, and the Lithuanian Balkan Investment Bank in the RS. The Zagrebacka Banka took a controlling 
share in Hrvatska Banka Mostar, which changed its name in Zagrebacka Banka BH Mostar; the Croat bank 
also bought a majority share in Universal Banka in January 2001, and it is entering into the RS banking 
market by taking over the assets and liabilities of the Komercijalna Banka Tuzla. The Slovenian Bank 
Domzale acquired a majority stake in the Commercial Bank Sahinpasic, renamed Commercebank. In 
November 2000 the Islamic Development Bank, the Dubai Islamic Bank and the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Bank founded the Bosnia Bank International Sarajevo.   26  
Other financial intermediaries and the financial markets. An organised capital market does not yet 
exist in BH. As for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, a Contract on License with 
Lubljana Stock Exchange has been signed, prescribing the transfer of the Slovenian trading software system 
to the future Sarajevo Stock Exchange; the test trading system is already installed. The formation of the 
Steering Board of potential founders has been initiated. The establishment of the first brokerage and dealing 
houses is in process. 
An effective, comprehensive and quick privatisation is the primary step for capital market’s 
development. Management companies and investment funds are key actors in the public subscription of 
shares of enterprises subject to privatisation. In 2000 the Federation Securities Commission was occupied 
with several applications for the establishment of privatisation investment fund management companies and 
of privatisation investment funds. The minimum registered capital necessary for the establishment of a 
privatisation fund is 200 millions KM. The Commission has passed so far 12 resolutions on the issuance of 
licenses for the establishment of privatisation investment fund management companies, and 13 resolutions 
on the issuance of licenses for the establishment of privatisation investment funds. The total registered 
capital invested in these management companies is 12.3 millions KM, out of which the 27% is foreign 
capital. Five banks have been issued licenses to perform depository business operations for privatisation 
investment funds. 
FBH legislation differs two methods of issuing securities, public offering and private placement. 
According to the Law on Securities, any issuer must report the private placement of shares to the 
Commission prior to the beginning of the subscription, and submit a report of the private placement after 
completion. By December 31
st, 2000, ten issues were reported (20.1 millions KM of total value), out of 
which six issues were completed (6.9 millions KM) and three were being still in process. So far, there has 
not been requests by stock companies to perform sales of shares through public offering, with the exception 
of privatisation investment funds. 
In BH there are too many insurance companies which are undercapitalised, do not apply international 
standards of risk management, and do not always fulfil their obligations; there are three types of insurance in 
BH: car, property, and life. The largest insurance companies are state-owned. The insurance industry lacks 
an effective supervisory body. 
3.2 Efficiency and risks 
At the end of 1998, bank capital for FBH commercial banks amounted to 784 million KM, but net 
bank capital was  -4.5 billion KM, reflecting poor quality of on- and off-balance sheet assets held by large 
state owned banks. Poor assets (rated C-E) represented 63 per cent of all on- and off-balance sheet assets for 
FBH banks; the ratio was 22 per cent for private banks taken separately. In 1998, the return on assets was 
0.21 per cent (0.49 per cent for private banks); the return on share capital amounted to 2.09 per cent (3.17 for 
private banks). 
High risks in the credit market, market segmentation, and inadequate protection against borrowers’ 
insolvency produce high lending interest rates and spreads. The interest rates imposed at annual level are 
between 5 and 60 per cent (between 2 and 25 per cent on long-term credits), and they are higher in the RS; 
on the other hand, rates on demand deposits are between 0.5 and 26 per cent, and between 1 and 34 per cent 
on time and savings deposits. Thus, in many banks the interest rate spread is of 20 percentage points, 
reaching sometimes 50; spreads tend to be higher in the RS. The credit interest rates imposed by the private 
banks are considerable higher than in the state owned banks, especially when compared with those in the 
developing banks established by the state.  
RS Government has recently passed a decision, that sets a ceiling of 10 per cent on credit interest rates 
imposed by state-owned banks; some doubts have rightfully arisen about banks’ capacity to implement such 
a decision without incurring in new losses. 
The new foreign competition, however, is reducing interest rate margins, with rates on 3-5 years loans 
falling from 15-20 per cent or higher to around 12-13 per cent.  
3.3 The payment system   27  
In Yugoslavia, all public and private financial activities, including payment transactions, savings, tax 
collection, tax distribution, treasury functions, and public and private expenditures were controlled through a 
monopoly institution, the Payments Bureau (SDK). During the war, the SDK in Bosnia split into three 
separate organisations: the Sarajevo-based Bosniac organisation (ZPP), the West-Mostar-based Croat 
organisation (ZAP), and the Banja-Luka-based Serb organisation (SPP). Anyway, the Payments Bureaux’s 
day to day activities had remained essentially unchanged from the pre-war era: they collected all taxes and 
tax returns, conducted all public and private payment transactions, held all public and private cash reserves, 
managed all governmental financial transactions, and collected all customs’ duties. Banks were not allowed 
to conduct payment transactions, neither were they permitted to mediate consumer cash deposits. The SDK 
was designed as a control mechanism to support a centrally planned social economic system: at the end of 
each day, all businesses and banks were required to deposit daily their receipts at the Payments Bureau, 
robbing banks of their primary source of cash deposits, and lowering dramatically banking income. 
Payments Bureaux’s monopoly on domestic non-cash payments was removed in 1999. 
To perform a non cash transaction through a Payments Bureau, a payment order must be issued to 
move money from a commercial bank account to a Payments Bureau Giro account; Giro accounts, however, 
must have a zero balance at the beginning and at the end of each day. Payment orders are still the primary 
mode of performing non cash payments; cheques are not used by the public, and the use of plastic cards is 
possible only in a few hotels and restaurants. 
A preliminary report completed by a team of experts on Payments Bureaux focused on the 
interrelation between functions that are performed by the Payments Bureaux, in order to identify the 
appropriate sequencing for transfer of the different components of these functions to government institutions 
(Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Tax Administration) and to commercial banks. The team found that the 
Payments Bureaux provided very little accounting services and they contributed little to the tax collection 
process. The financial verification of the assets of the Payments Bureaux was completed in April, 2000. 
Neither the ZPP (Bosnian) nor the ZAP (Croat) have revealed large anomalies; some items recorded in the 
balance sheet of the SPP (Serb) would have to be written off. This verification was necessary for transfer of 
assets to the institutions which would take over the functions performed by the Payments Bureaux. A number 
of functions have already been transferred to public institutions such as Cantonal and Entity Treasuries, Tax 
and Custom Administrations, Statistical and Privatisation Agencies. 
At the beginning of 2001 the Payment Bureaux have developed into agencies for financial, IT and 
agent services. The agencies signed temporary contracts with the CBBH for acceptance, storage and issuing 
of cash until the end of April. Thus the CBBH is allowed to use 12 individual vaults of these agencies. 
The inter-bank market. In May, 2000, the Central Bank signed with Logica of London a contract 
relating to a new Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS), covering high value and priority payments, 
and operating on a gross settlement basis. In August, the Central Bank signed another contract with Logica 
and with Halcom of Ljubjana for computer equipment and software. These firms have also enabled a new 
bulk of clearinghouses for retail payments (20,000 KM or less) established by the CBBH, the Bulk Clearing 
System (BCS). The CBBH initially operates the clearinghouses in its Main Units of Banja Luka, Mostar and 
Sarajevo, but it may add other cities in the future if the volume of orders requires. As BCS provides 
clearance on a net basis, it imposes particularly stringent criteria. For needs of this system, a new banking 
network has been made, connecting all commercial banks through the Main Units of the CBBH into the 
Unified Gyro Clearing in the CBBH in Sarajevo. The CBBH has provided the necessary equipment and the 
rented line from the commercial banks to the relevant Main Unit of the CBBH.  
In the period from January 5
th to March 31
st, 2001, a total of 2.3 million transactions were performed 
in gyro clearing and RTGS system, with a value of 3.2 billion KM. As expected, the large number of 
transactions of small value was performed through gyro clearing (2,123,203 transactions and 1,339 millions 
KM), and transactions of big value were performed through RTGS system (183,515 transactions and 2,098 
millions KM). Although 43 banks participate to both systems, the 75% of transactions are concentrated in 
only 12 of them. Then next problem to be solved is the issue of the banks from one Entity wishing to 
perform transactions in the other Entity: banks are allowed to open branches in another Entity if registered in 
one, but the Law on Banks did not anticipate the technical issue of the performance of payment transactions 
in the other Entity.   28  
Table 1   29  
1997 1998 1999 Prel. 2000 Prog.
Nominal GDP (millions of KM) 6,116    7,141    8,043    9,075   
   out of which: Federation 4,748    5,407    5,833    6,434   
                      Republika Srpska 1,368    1,734    2,210    2,641   
Industrial production (percent change)
   Federation 36    24    11    15   
   Republika Srpska 27    23    2    12   
Federation employment (end-period, thousands) (1) 288    336    356    360   
Wages (KM/month) (2)
   Federation 493    524    551    597   
   Republika Srpska (3) 138    ...    ...    392   
Percent change
Real GDP (annual average) 40    13    9    10   
CPI (12-month average)
   Federation (in KM terms) 14    5    0    2   
   Republika Srpska (in YUD terms) 3    38    ....    ....   
   Republika Srpska (DM/KM-based index) (4) -7    2    14    10   
Change in percent of opening broad mone
Money and credit (5)
Broad money 52    31    40    13   
Net foreign assets -11    1    38    -3   
Net domestic assets 63    30    2    16   
In percent of GDP
Fiscal balances
Federation
   Revenue 13    13    12    13   
   Expenditure 14    14    14    16   
   Balance (6) -1    -2    -1    -3   
Republika Srpska (7)
   Revenue 15    21    30    26   
   Expenditure 15    26    35    30   
   Balance (6) 0    -5    -5    -4   
in millions of USD, unless otherwise stated
External current account balance (8) -1,482    -986    -1,058    -942   
   Exports 575    697    649    732   
   Imports 2,333    2,656    2,502    2,338   
External debt (9)
   in millions of USD 4,076    2,985    3,095    2,632   
   in percent of GDP 119    74    71    62   
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Source: IMF. Data refer to the entire country, unless otherwise indicated.  (1) Excludes people formally employed but not working; data for 1997 and 1998 i
personnel. (2) Average of monthly gross wages paid in the year (first eleven months of 1999). (3) For 1997, YUD wages converted into DM using the parall
exchange rate. (4) Until mid-1998 prices converted from YUD into DM using the parallel market exchange rate. (5) In percent of beginning of year broad mo
Before grants. (7) Excludes municipal government operations. (8) Excluding official transfer. Data for 1997-1999 are rough estimates for the whole territory
Projected external debt and debt service for 1998 exclude debt relief.  30  
 
Table 2 
31 Dec. 1997 31 Dec. 1998 31 Dec. 1999 31 Dec. 2000
amount % amount % amount % amount %
Money (M1) 252 21.4 310 20.0 1,100 50.8 1,405 55.9
     Cash outside banks 113 9.6 162 10.5 515 23.8 652 26.0
     Demand deposits in domestic currency 139 11.8 148 9.6 585 27.0 753 29.9
Quasi money (QM) 926 78.6 1,237 80.0 1,065 49.2 1,109 44.1
      Time and savings deposits in domestic currency 9 8.0 8 0.5 23 1.1 76 3.0
      Total deposits in foreign currency 917 77.8 1,229 79.4 1,042 48.1 1,033 41.1
Money supply (M2) 1,178 100.0 1,547 100.0 2,165 100,0 2,514 100,0
Sources: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bullettin, n.4, Jan/Dec 2000.
Items
MONEY SUPPLY STRUCTURE (M2)
(millions of KM)
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Table 3 
Assets
Foreign assets 144 283 866 1,044
Claims on Government 0 0 0 0
Claims on nonfinancial enterprises 0 0 0 0
Claims on private sector 0 0 0 0
                                                        Total 144 283 866 1,044
Liabilities
Reserve money 170 239 814 945
out of which: cash outside banks 113 162 515 652
Demand deposits in foreign currency 0 0 0 5
Time and savings deposits in domestic currency 0 0 0 0
Time and savings deposits in foreign currency 0 0 0 0
Money market instruments 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 0 0 0
Restricted deposits 0 0 0 0
Foreign liabilities 0 0 0 1
General government deposits 0 7 9 10
Government credit funds 0 0 0 0
Funds counterparts 0 0 0 0
Capital accounts 1 30 34 59
Other items (net) -27 7 9 24
                                                   Total 144 283 866 1,044
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bullettin, n.4, Jan/Dec 2000.
31 Dec.1998 31 Dec.1999
BALANCE SHEET OF CBBH
(millions of KM)
Items 31 Dec.1997 31 Dec. 2000
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Table 4 
Assets
Reserves 239         207         276         289        
Foreign assets 658         605         848         1,010        
Claims on Government 134         113         37         35        
Claims on nonfinancial enterprises 2,171         2,547         2,468         2,623        
Claims on private sector 134         261         277         401        
                                      Total  3,336         3,733         3,906         4,358        
Liabilities
General government deposits 234         222         170         144        
Other demand deposits in domestic currency 139         147         584         753        
Other demand deposits in foreign currency 448         638         465         553        
Time and savings deposits in domestic currency 9         8         23         76        
Time and savings deposits in foreign currency 363         467         577         475        
Credits from CBBH 0         0         0         0        
Money market instruments 0         0         0         0        
Bonds 14         11         9         4        
Restricted deposits 10         2         0         1        
Foreign liabilities 1,514         1,606         1,519         1,585        
Government credit funds 0         0         0         7        
Funds counterparts 0         0         0         0        
Capital accounts 1,043         1,305         1,257         1,140        
Other items (net) -438         -673         -698         -379        
                                           Total 3,336         3,733         3,906         4,358        
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bullettin, n.4, Jan/Dec 2000.
31 Dec.1998 31 Dec.1999
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN BH
(millions of KM)
Items 31 Dec.1997 31 Dec. 2000
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Figure 1 
BH BANKS FOREIGN ASSETS 
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Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Figure 2 
BH BANKS SHORT-TERM CREDITS 
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Figure 3 













31 Dec.1998 31 Dec.1999 31 Dec. 2000  
Source: Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
   34  
COUNTRY PROFILE: BULGARIA 
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1. Transition process 
The 1998 has been a year of transition after the deep crisis of 1997. Inflation has fallen to 1 per cent 
against 578 per cent in 1997. Industrial production has shown signs of recovery. The official unemployment 
rate has been 10.7 per cent of active population, although probably underestimated and bound to increase 
according to progress of the privatisation process. 
The primary objective of the Government is that of privatisation and under this point of view Bulgaria 
is subject to a particular monitoring from the IMF that has linked any support to the realisation of the almost 
totality of planned privatisation within 2000.  
Substantial improvement has been achieved in the liberalisation of the trade and foreign exchange 
regime as well as in price liberalisation. The trade tariff regime has been reduced and simplified, most export 
taxes has been eliminated and the number of products subjected to licensing requirements has been greatly 
reduced. 
The currency board, introduced in July 1997 has been successful in pursuing its stabilisation goal, 
contributing to the dramatic decline in inflation, to a fall in interest rates and to the reduction of the fiscal 
deficit to sustainable levels. The external public debt is large but decreasing and has been restructured more 
favorably in terms of maturity. 
Privatisation has been so far realised through several channels: 
1) direct privatisation by the Privatisation Agency or Ministries; 
2) two rounds of mass privatisation (the second one from January 1999); 
3) privatisation under the coordination of advisors and consultants; 
4) sale of shares on the national stock exchange (see below) – marginal so far. 
By the middle of 2000, significant progress has been made in the privatisation of state owned 
enterprises, and several of the country largest enterprises were sold. The sale of the telecommunications 
operator is near completion: it will be the largest privatisation of the country up to now 
2. Institutional aspects 
Several attempts at economic reform in Bulgaria failed due to the fact that they were made under a 
non-democratic regime: the collapse of the Bulgarian banking system in Fall 1996 is one major indicator of 
financial sector distress. 
In 1997, under pressure of the IMF, a currency board was introduced aimed at anchoring monetary 
policy and compressing inflation.  
Improved banking supervision and stronger enforcement of prudential regulation have helped to 
strengthen the banking sector. Bank capital rose by 30 per cent in a year to June 1999 boosting capital 
adequacy ratio to 40 while the required 10 per cent risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio was met by all banks 
(the requirement has been raised to 12 per cent – with minimum capital of 7.7 million Euro – by the end of 
1999). 
Bank privatisation has been delayed by vested interests and political indecisiveness although the IMF 
suggested three amongst the largest banks to be privatised by the end of 1999. State saving banks became 
full-fledged commercial banks in 1998 with a government guarantee on deposits. 
Authorities intended to liquidate 11 banks to which government is the main creditor. The draft law on 
bank bankruptcies has been adopted at the beginning of 2000 (deposit insurance funds will handle bank 
failures). 
The privatisation of the five largest banks is planned for 2001. The banking regulatory power relies on 
the BNB, that pursues a policy of strictly adherence to international practices (EU directives on banking as 
well as Basle Committee). 
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The first half of 1999 saw draft amendments to the Law on Banks which came into force in June 1999. 
They helped to improve the legal framework by clarifying terms and expanding the scope of supervisory 
measures against banks, with a special view to accelerating bankruptcy proceedings. According to the new 
legal framework, commercial banks have to produce a monthly balance sheet and income statement. The 
BNB is introducing a risk assessment system CAMEL. As of now banks deemed to be in compliance with 
the newly introduced system are 22 out of 34, including 5 banks of systemic importance, and 15 medium and 
small-scale banks (including two subsidiaries of foreign banks). 
3. The banking system 
3.1 Market structure 
The evolution of Bulgaria’s banking sector may be characterised by three distinct phases: during the 
first one, covering the 1930s and 1940s, about 60 commercial banks were operating in a market-oriented 
economy. This period was concluded by the nationalisation of 1948. The second phase covers the period of 
the state-organised centrally planned economy, which featured a concentration of financial resources while 
the independent role of the central bank was eliminated. Until the mid-1980s there were only two other 
financial institutions in addition to the BNB – the State Savings Bank and the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank. 
Just before the changes of 1989, some financial institutions were established for the purpose of financing 
specific sectors of the economy – agriculture, metallurgy and machine engineering, chemistry and 
pharmaceutical industry, large infrastructure projects, construction. The third phase is still running and is 
directly related to the transition to a market economy. As of the end of 1999 the Bulgarian banking sector 
comprised 34 commercial banks.  
3.2 Performance 
During the first half of 1999, 12 banks reported losses. The average weighted interest spread between 
assets and liabilities (on a yearly basis) is 6.1 per cent . The ratio of off-balance-sheet credit substitutes to the 
volume of extended credits was, on average, in June 1999 of 24 per cent . 
Amongst the 27 banks subject to capital adequacy regulations (i.e. excluding the branches of foreign 
banks), the value of the total capital adequacy indicator (capital base on risk-weighted assets) by bank varies 
from 15 to 284 per cent . 
3.3 Risk-taking 
As of June 1999, within the Bulgarian banking system, the share of standard exposures to financial 
and non-financial institutions was 83.1 per cent , and classified exposures in the two riskiest groups (doubtful 
and loss) amounted to 8.6 per cent .  
Most banks adopt a conservative policy of lending and maintain mainly risk-free and low-income 
assets witch limits the potential for securing higher efficiency, but also limits credit risk. 
The ratio of total banking system big credits to capital base was recently 1.13 times, far below the 
admissible eight times. At the same time, 13 banks reported big credit exposure exceeding the admissible 25 
per cent of their capital base. 
4. Money and financial markets 
Trade in Government securities, i.e. bills (with a maturity of up to one year), notes (with a maturity of 
one to five years) and bonds (with a maturity of over five years), represents a major part of the government 
securities and money market. 
The Ministry of Finance together with the BNB regulate both the primary and secondary markets for 
government securities and the Government Securities Depository settles the transactions. 
The secondary market is an over-the-counter one, with transactions confirmed by telex on the basis of 
offers exchanged via Reuters. 
Participants in the government securities and money market are all investment intermediaries, but only 
those which are authorised as primary dealers have access to the Government Security Depository. All other   36  
legal and physical persons may only participate in the primary and secondary markets through primary 
dealers. 
The Bulgarian securities market can be divided into two segments, a market for debt instruments and 
an equity market. A common feature of these markets is that the traded securities are held in book-entry 
form: Bulgarian legislation allows the existence of equities in paper forms, but only book-entry equities may 
be offered publicly. 
The equity market operates on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE). At present only equities are 
traded, but trading in corporate bonds and government securities is planned for the future.  
The Bulgarian Stock Exchange has the following market segments: 
1) the official market (divided into three sub-segments); 
2) the free market. 
Similarly to EU practice, the BSE has established minimum listing requirements, in terms of firm size, 
for each segment of the official market. The shares traded in the free market, usually belonging to firm 
involved in the mass privatisation program, do not meet the requirements to be admitted to quotation in the 
official market. 
Only investment intermediaries (stockbrokers and banks, including the branches and subsidiaries of 
foreign banks) authorised by the Securities and Stock Exchange Commission are admitted to stock exchange 
and over-the-counter transactions, that requires the physical presence of the brokers on the trading area. 
Recently screen based trading (without the physical presence of the broker) have been admitted on the free 
market segment only, but the number of BSE members making use of this opportunity, even if growing, is 
still low. 
To be admitted to trading activity an investment intermediary must be licensed by the Securities and 
Stock Exchange Commission (SSEC) and be member of the Stock Exchange. 
To be licensed by SSEC an intermediary (with the exception of banks, whose BNB license is 
comprehensive of any security transaction) must meet requirements relative to the adequacy of capital and 
the structure of his balance sheet. To be member of the Stock Exchange there are some further specific 
access criteria: holding of shares of the BSE, employment contract with at least two licensed brokers, etc. 
5. The payment system 
5.1 Overview 
The Bulgarian payment system undergone significant changes in the 1990s. The banking Integrated 
System for Electronic Payments, BISERA (Bulgaria’s national settlement system) was introduced in 1992, 
The national operator BORICA, was established in 1995 to service card payments. BORICA Ltd. is totally 
owned by the BNB and is the operator of an ATM and POS network in Bulgaria: it administers ATM and 
POS transactions and is responsible for the maintenance of the terminals, performs on-line authorisation of 
card payments and is authorised by its members to act as a settlement agent for domestic debit cards. 
Two securities settlement systems where also established, the Government Securities Depository 
(GSD) and the Central Depository AD (CDAD) in 1996. 
All the settlements systems in the country are organised as gross systems. The level of computerisation 
varies: BISERA is fully computerised, while for the other two settlements systems there are some manual 
operations in use, which are going to be minimised through the implementation of several new projects. 
According to the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, the central bank is responsible for the organisation, 
maintenance and development of the payment system. 
Cash payments are still widely used in the country. However, the share of non-cash payments is 
increasing. Credit transfer is the dominant non-cash payment instrument in terms of value and volume. The 
growth of card payment is considerable. 
During the 1999 bankrupt banks continued closing branches directly participating in the payment 
system and newly opened branches were included. As a result the number of direct participants in the 
payments system has increased by now to 622.   37  
Between January and June 1999, 6.696.962 interbank settlements were cleared through the BISERA 
electronic interbank transfer system. 
5.2 Payment media used by non-banks 
Cash. The monetary unit of Bulgaria is the lev (BGL). It was redenominated on July 5, 1999 (when 
1000 old levs were replaced by 1 new lev). One new lev is divisible in 100 stotinkas. 
The BNB has the exclusive right to issue banknotes. Since 1998 they were printed abroad, but now 
they are printed internally by the BNB. The coins are produced at the Bulgarian Mint, which is a company 
totally owned by the central bank. The BNB distributes and collects banknotes and coins through its head 
office and its branches across the country. 
Cash payments are widespread in Bulgaria, even if there is no reliable statistical data on the 
correspondent volume and value. However at the end of 1997 the banknotes and coins in circulation 
represented 57.4 per cent of the M1 Monetary aggregate and 7.68 of 1997 GDP.  
The number of citizens holding accounts connected to debit cards has increased in recent years: 
however, most salaries are still paid in cash. 
Debit cards are used almost exclusively at ATMs as cash dispensers: almost all retail transactions are 
made in cash, owing to the small number of POS terminals available. 
Non cash. Non cash payments can be operated by a payer that holds a current account or a demand 
deposit. Each person my hold accounts in national or foreign currencies without limitations. Most banks 
offer account in Bulgarian levs, US Dollars, Deutsche Marks and Swiss Francs. However, in accordance with 
currency legislation, payments within the country can only be made in Bulgarian levs. Payments in foreign 
currency are allowed only for imports of goods and services, studies and medical treatment abroad, etc. 
Credit transfer is the most widely used form of payment between entities in the corporate and the 
public sectors. It is also used for the payment of salaries, taxes, duties, subscription fees, etc. For most banks, 
credit transfers constitute over 95 per cent of all payments. Usually a transaction takes up to three working 
days (more for payments abroad operated by small banks with a limited number of foreign correspondents). 
Only banks licensed to operate abroad are entitled to make cross-border credit transfers. For these 
services Bulgarian banks use correspondent accounts with foreign banks and the payments are executed 
through S.W.I.F.T. 
Cheques have never been widely used as a payment instrument in Bulgaria, mainly due to the risk 
associated: they represent a negligible percentage of all payments, their use being limited to counterparts 
which are well-acquainted one another. 
Direct debits (indebtments of bank account with the permission of the holder) is increasingly used to 
pay providers of telephone, electricity, water and heating services as well in the securities settlement.  
Credit cards are not yet widespread: several Bulgarian banks issue them under agreements with 
foreign counterparts (VISA, Eurocard/MasterCard and American Express circuits). On the contrary debit 
card (especially domestic one) are increasingly used. By the end of 1997 eight banks were issuing cards. All 
of them are members of the national card payments system BORICA. 
Telecommunications companies and chains of petrol stations issue prepaid cards. 
At the end of 1998 there was one ATM network in Bulgaria (operated by BORICA) and two POS 
networks (operated by BORICA and the Bulgarian Post Bank). The network of ATM and POS terminals is 
not very extensive at the moment but it is growing: the number of ATMs was 32 in 1995, 118 in 1997 and 
180 in the second quarter of 1999. POS terminals was 100 in 1997 and increased to more than 510 in the 
second quarter of 1999. 
The postal network is the largest branch network in Bulgaria. It is used for money transfer in small 
villages in which there are no bank branches, or if either the payer or the payee does not have a bank 
account. The total amounts of payments is currently negligible compared to the volume regulated through 
BISERA.   38  
There is a significant interest in Bulgaria in making payments over the Internet, but, due to the limited 
number of credit cards, the total amounts of such payments remains low. Only one bank handles Internet 
transaction with cards, but it processes the transactions as mail orders (sophisticated systems complying with 
internationally set standards are not yet operative). 
Furthermore a number of banks cooperates with Western Union in the execution of fast money 
transfers. 
Some banks recently started offering home banking (or telebanking) services. 
5.3 Interbank exchange and settlements system 
Most of the non-cash payments in Bulgaria are settled through the national settlement system, 
BISERA (Banking Integrated System for Electronic tRAnsfer), which is a gross settlement system that has 
been operating since 1992. It has two basic functions: 
a) the clearing of electronic messages comprising payments instruction of banks; 
b) the settlement of payments. 
BISERA operates at T+1 value date: nevertheless there is an option for some payments to be settled 
during the same working day directly by the BNB, on the basis of payments orders presented directly at the 
counters of the BNB. This express service (that settles a limited number of transaction of high value) is 
dedicated to bank-to-bank payments related to interbank money market operations, payments on the primary 
and secondary State security market, as well as some budget payments or payments initiated by or addressed 
to the BNB. 
BISERA has been designed, programmed and implemented by Bankservice Joint Stock Company on 
behalf of the BNB. Bankservice is responsible for the development, maintenance and operation of the 
system. It also offers other telecommunications and banking automation services to banks. The major 
shareholder of the company is BNB (37 per cent of the capital). The remaining shares are distributed 
amongst commercial banks, according to quotas depending on the volume of bank activity as well of the 
number of branches belonging to the bank and the size of each bank’s own capital. 
Bankservice has a pyramid structure with a head office, five branches and 28 local offices, which are 
the access point to BISERA. 
According to the current banking regulation, all licensed banks in Bulgaria are obliged to make all the 
interbank payments trough BISERA (bank whose license have been withdrawn are immediately excluded 
from the system). Also branches of banks that do not have an internal payment system can access directly to 
BISERA. 
There are also two non-bank financial institution which also have direct access to BISERA: the 
Central Depository AD and BORICA. They respectively act as settlement agents in the payment related to 
securities transaction and interbank payments related to card transaction. 
It is expected that the current system will be replaced by an RTGS system (BISERA4) in the next 
future.   39    40  
 
COUNTRY PROFILE: CROAZIA 
∗   
 
 
1.  The economic structure 
1.1 Economic background (1992-97).  
Independent since October 8 1991, Croatia economy went through a deep recession until late 1993 
when a successful stabilisation plan was launched. Led by domestic demand, economic growth recovered 
from the first quarter of 1994 to the third quarter of 1998 with real GDP increasing around 6 per cent a year 
(Fig.1). After a period of hyperinflation, prices regained stability in 1995 when the increment of retail prices 
and of cost of living was around 3-4 per cent a year and nominal wages stabilised in 1996 (Fig.2). External 
imbalances widened because the bold increase of domestic demand – mainly private consumption – pushed 
import while export stagnated due to the loss of competitiveness triggered by wage increases greater then 
productivity gains: from a surplus of 5,5 per cent of GDP in 1993-94, the current account reached a 
unsustainable deficit of 23 per cent of GDP in the last quarter of 1997 (Fig.3 and 5). Deficits were mainly 
financed by capital inflows sustained by the repatriation of resident’s foreign savings. Foreign exchange 
reserves at the Central bank, equalling only 1.6 month of goods’ imports in 1993, doubled in 1996 reaching 
3.2 month. A prudent fiscal policy kept the consolidated central government budget in balance with a surplus 
of 1.6 per cent of GDP in 1994 and a deficit of 1.3 per cent in 1997 (Fig.5). Deficits were domestically 
financed until 1996 when the share of external sources jumped over 40 per cent of the total debt (Fig.6). The 
middle solvency rating (BBB or Baa) given to Croatia by leading credit rating agencies, made easier to 
collect capital from international markets at interest rates below domestic rates. Domestic market for public 
debt remained underdeveloped and total Croatian external debt soared from 23 to 35 per cent of GDP (Fig.7). 
In 1996-97 short term debt stayed around 7 per cent of total debt; the share of public creditors decreased 
from 23 to 14 per cent while that of private creditors increased from 20 to 31 per cent.  
 
1.2 Recent developments (1998-2000).  
In 1997 economy showed signs of overheating and macroeconomic policies were tightened late that 
year, early 1998 and again in early 1999. Economic activities experienced a slowdown: in the last quarter of 
1998 GDP fell by 4.4 per cent and did not resume growth until the last quarter of 1999. On average, 1999 
recorded a 0.4 per cent fall in GDP; growth accelerated in 2000 reaching 4.5 per cent in the second quarter 
and 4.1 per cent at year-end. Policy interventions and economic downturn reduced the current account deficit 
to 7,5 per cent of GDP (2,5 per cent by end-2000) but structural imbalances were not properly addressed. 
Policy stances were constrained by the emergence of a banking crisis exacerbated by a loss of confidence in 
international markets (Croatia was downgraded to BB+). Failures in industrial restructuring led to growing 
domestic arrears of private and public enterprises. The unexpected large revenue from the introduction of 
VAT (January 1998) was accompanied by renewed spending pressures and a relaxation of fiscal stance. In 
1999 Government expenditure equalled 50 per cent of GDP, 47 per cent in year 2000. External debt mounted 
to 49 per cent of GDP in 1999 and increased again in 2000 at 57,5 per cent; short term debt represented 4.6 
and 6.5 per cent of the total in 1999 and 2000 while the share of private creditors remained around 42 per 
cent; the share of foreign financing of total Central Government debt has reached 64 (Fig.6). Since the 
second half of 1998 competitiveness improved due to exchange rate depreciation (Fig.9) and real wages 
modest increases. Nevertheless Croatian exports faced difficulties coming from either specific problems of 
quality and variety in the composition of goods and from a decreasing trend in the European demand. In 
March 1999 macroeconomic policies were tightened again following concerns about reserves, external 
financing and currency depreciation. Exchange rate remains fairly stable during 1999 showing a new 
depreciation trend thereafter. In 2000 prices went under pressure and retail prices increased by 7.4 per cent at 
year-end (6.2 on average). On July 17, 2000 Croatia became the 137
th member of the WTO: on a 5-7 years 
transitional period, Croatia is committed to lower the average nominal tariff rate from 10 to 5.3 per cent (by 
2005) on industrial products and from 33.7 to 16.4 (by 2007) for agriculture products and foodstuffs. 
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2. Institutional Aspects 
2.1 Legal framework of banking and financial activities.  
A market-oriented legal framework was introduced with the Law on the National Bank of Croatia 
(1992), the Law on Banks and Savings Banks (1993) and the Law on Bank Rehabilitation (1994). With this 
framework the banking system rapidly developed, either in the number of banks and in operational volumes, 
until end-1997. In 1998 a deep banking crisis erupted due to unsoundness of many banks structure and 
activities, weak supervision authority of the Croatian National Bank (CNB), adverse economic developments 
and monetary tightening. The New Banking Law passed at the end of 1998 and CNB’s surveillance functions 
were strengthened. In line with international standards and BIS recommendations, the new legislation sets 
higher minimum initial capital requirements, strengthens maximum exposure levels and capital ratios, 
reinforces organisational structure, internal controls and auditing of banks; it improves financial discipline 
and procedures for bank exit, strengthens the reporting system to CNB and defines actions that can be taken 
to prevent and to address critical situations. The New Banking Law establishes the institution of temporary 
administrator in charge of the strategy of failing banks and it abolishes the category of savings banks, 
requiring these institutions to meet the characteristics of commercial banks by end-2001. Other relevant 
financial laws pertain to the issue and sales of securities (1995, amended in 1998), to the establishment of 
investment funds (1995, 1996) and to the take-over of joint-stock companies (1997). With the establishment 
of the Croatian Securities and Exchange Commission (1995) and the Central Depository Agency (1997), 
infrastructure and legal framework have made advances although they still need refinements. In April 2001 a 
new law on CNB was enacted; according to EU comments the new law is not completely in line with EU 
legislation perspective regarding the institutional, personal and financial independence of the central bank.  
2.2 The structure of the banking and financial systems.  
As of June 2001 there are 42 licensed banks and 25 savings and housing banks; all credit 
intermediaries are under CNB surveillance. There are six representative offices, one of which is the Italian 
Cassa di Risparmio di Udine e Pordenone. Seventeen banks and saving banks are under bankruptcy 
procedures; to other nine intermediearies, license has been revoked during 2000-01. Foreign banks control 
twelve Croatian banks, five of which at 100%. Recently, Italian participation in Croatian banks increased 
substantially: besides Cassa di Risparmio di Trieste, which founded and now holds 72 per cent of “C.R. 
Trieste d.d.” in Zagreb, and Finanziaria per i Traffici Internazionali, which appears to have a 7 per cent in a 
Croatian bank, Gruppo Intesa (thorough Banca Commerciale Italiana) and Unicredito acquired majority 
stakes in former public Privredna (66.6 per cent) and Splitska Banka (63 per cent) respectively. Unicredito 
has also planned to acquire 70 per cent of voting shares in Zagrebacka banka. Commercial banks remain the 
cornerstone of the financial system, non-banking sectors playing a marginal role. Insurance sector is rapidly 
developing. At the end of 1999 there were 26 insurance companies in Croatia, four are controlled by foreign 
investors, other three companies have substantial foreign participation and two are state-owned, one of which 
is going to be privatised. Insurance market is highly concentrated but quite competitive; the new Insurance 
Act should improve competitiveness and soundness of this sector.  
2.3 Monetary policy.  
Price stability, liquidity and solvency of the banking system are the objectives of CNB’s policies. 
Croatia has a managed floating exchange rate regime; exchange rate is the nominal anchor for monetary 
policy. Monetary policy’s instruments are standard and include: Reserve requirements at 23.5 per cent 
reserve rate (22 per cent since July 2001) with 4.5 per cent remuneration on kuna deposits and international 
market rate for the foreign currency component; CNB bills in kuna and foreign currency; Repo auction for 
short-term bridging of liquidity on CNB and Treasury bills (banks offer the interest rate and the nominal 
amount of bills they want to sell); Lombard loans for credits up to 15 working days per month; Overnight 
loans (must be repaid the next working day); Short-term liquidity granted to troubled but not insolvent banks 
for liquidity problems with a final maturity within a year; Short term to the Government for bridging inflow 
and outflow discrepancies (credits must not exceed 5 per cent of the budget of the current year and must be 
repaid by the end of the current fiscal year). Foreign exchange management uses compulsory kuna deposit by 
banks with CNB for foreign financial credits; foreign currency auctions; foreign currency swaps; a 
compulsory ratio between forex claims and liabilities and a limited forex position exposure to currency risk 
position and capital. In September 2000 CNB decided to unify reserve requirements on kuna and foreign 
exchange deposit, causing an upsurge in liquidity which was sterlized by banks’ investments in CNB bills. In   42  
year 2000 monetary aggregates showed a relatively high growth but high liquidity of the banking system and 
low interest rates did not trigger an increase of real sector lending and employment. For 2001 monetary 
policy is targeted to an inflation rate not exceeding 4.5 per cent; further reduction of interest rates is 
expected.  
3. The Banking System 
3.1 Development of the banking system.  
In the last decade Croatian banking system underwent two crisis. The first one, rooted in the financial 
misbehaviour of the previous political regime, was not timely addressed. Banking system’s unsoundness was 
exacerbated by lax requirements while inflationary growth and high liquidity – partly due to the repatriation 
of savings by residents – contributed to the rapid increase of the number of banks and their activities. 
Supervisory authorities had weak legal power, inadequate structures and expertise to address banking crisis. 
Reforms did not change business practices: several state-owned banks still enjoyed financial support; 
privatisation often left old management unchanged, ties between enterprises and banks survived, small and 
inefficient universal banks could be established. Four out of the six largest banks went insolvent and were 
recapitalized with an estimated cost of 22 per cent of the 1997 GDP. The second crisis began in March 1998 
with the insolvency of the fifth largest bank followed by a number of small and medium-size bank failures. 
The crisis involved around 12 per cent of total bank assets; the rehabilitation cost around 5 per cent of GDP. 
In terms of GDP, total banks’ assets picked at 69 per cent in 1997 dropping four points by end-1999. Since 
end-1994 foreign claims accounted for 8-10 per cent of GDP (12.5 per cent in 2000). Claims on domestic 
sector represented about 50 per cent of GDP: claims towards Government halved form 20 to 11 per cent 
while those towards private sectors increased from 32 to 39 per cent (Fig.10). Claims on banking and 
financial institution remained negligible. Total loans increased form 26 to 37.5 per cent of GDP (41 per cent 
of GDP in 1998); foreign currency loans dropped from 12 to 4.6 per cent of GDP (Fig.11). Loans to 
domestic enterprises were fairly stable around 20-22 per cent (26 per cent in 1998) but currency composition 
showed dramatic changes over the period; loans to households increased form 4 to 15 per cent (Fig.12). 
Croatian banking activities are founded over narrow basis and this reflects a low degree of economic 
development (Fig.13). Saving ratio recovered from end-1995 minimum (10 per cent of GDP) to 20 per cent 
in 2000. Financial depth – given by the ratio of intermediation volumes over GDP –increased at 63 per cent 
in 2000. Money multiplier – an indicator of banks’ ability in creating deposit money – reached 3.2 in the first 
quarter 1998 and then decreased to 2.3 along with monetary policy tightening. The level of private sector 
credit decreased until 1996 reaching 2.6 times the base money; then increased at 3.2 at the end of 1998 and 
then decreased again to 2 by the last quarter of 2000. The share of foreign currency deposits is in the range of 
37 (Apr. 1995) 45 (March 2001) per cent of total banks liabilities while forex deposits blocked for 
bankruptcy procedures decreased from 30 to 1.3 per cent of banks liabilities (Fig.14).  
3.2 Market structure.  
Official statistics divide banks in six groups according to the size of total assets. Out of the 45 
reporting commercial banks at end-2000, eighteen have assets for over 1 billion kuna (130 million US$) of 
which only two exceeding 10 billion kuna; twenty-four banks have assets in the range 100-1.000 million 
kuna; three small bank have less then 100 million kuna assets. Saving and housing banks (29) represent a 
marginal share, slightly over 1 per cent, of total banking assets. For surveillance porpoises banks are divided 
in four main categories. At the end of 1998 non-problematic banks numbered 17 and represented 72 per cent 
of total banking assets; 26 were regional banks without operating problems (7.4 per cent of total assets); 9 
banks (9.5 per cent of total assets) were experiencing operational difficulties while those under bankruptcy (7 
banks for 7 per cent of total assets) were responsible of the bulk of banking sector losses equalling 215 
million US$ (one per cent of GDP). In year 2000 the privatisation of the banking system drastically 
accelerated: the number of State-owned banks were reduced from ten to three, domestic private owned banks 
decreased from 30 to 21 while foreign investors control 20 banks (13 in 1999). In terms of total assets, State 
and State-participated banks account for only 6 per cent in 2000, down from 45 per cent in 1999; domestic 
private banks account for 10 per cent (14.5 per cent in 1999) while foreign owned banks represent almost 84 
per cent of total (Fig 15). With recent acquisitions performed by Gruppo Intesa and Unicredito, Italian 
investors account for a substantial share of foreign banks in Croatia. The concentration of the Croatian 
banking system is high and stable: the biggest bank (Zagrbacka, privatised in middle-90s’), accounts for 
almost a quarter of total assets; the first two for 47 per cent and the top four banks for 61 per cent (Fig. 16).    43  
3.3 Efficiency and risks.  
Interest rates started to stabilise in the first quarter of 1994; from March 1994 to March 2001 average 
rates on local currency credits declined from 23.3 to 8.9 per cent and from 5.6 to 3.6 per cent on deposits. On 
average, in 2000 spread stood at 8.3 per cent (Fig.17) and decreased to 6.7 per cent in first quarter of 2001. 
Many are the reason for high interest rates in Croatia: risk premium for capital, currency and credit risk 
premium, inadequate credit policies and risk management by banks, expensive funding and financial markets 
inefficiency (segmentation, low competitiveness, poor supply of financial instruments). The high level of 
interest rates is reflected also in the structure of official rates (Fig.18). After the 1998 banking crisis, capital 
adequacy for the entire banking system fell at 12.7 per cent from 17,7 per cent of 1996; by official figure in 
year 2000 it stands at 21.4 per cent. Bad loans (categories C, D,E) reached 10.3 per cent of total portfolio in 
1999 and decreased by one percentage point in year 2000 (Fig.19). It should be noted that according to IMF 
“Bank’s annual financial statements tend to understate the riskiness of their assets....leading to 
underprovisioning of bad assets and overstatement of capital adequacy ratios” (IMF, March 2001, p.54). 
4  Financial System 
4.1 Other financial intermediaries.  
Banks are by far the most important financial intermediaries, other intermediaries playing a marginal 
role. After 1994 liberalisation act, small private-owned insurance companies have began to flourish; 
international players are interested in Croatian insurance market after war’s end in 1995. In 1998 a new 
Insurance Act improved financial soundness by raising capital requirements and strengthening operational 
and auditing procedures. The growth of the insurance sector could be reinforced by the privatisation of the 
biggest State-owned insurance company, by the inroad of European intermediaries (especially from Austria 
and Germany) financially assisted by EBRD, by the pension system’s reform and by the diffusion of health 
insurance and of new financial-insurance instruments. In 1999 insurance market collected 4.3 billion kuna 
(567 million US$) gross premium, equal to 3 per cent of GDP and up 6.5 per cent from the year before. Non-
life insurance accounts for 84 per cent and motor third-party liability for 34 per cent of total business. Croatia 
Insurance, first State-owned company, holds 54.6 per cent of the market; the second one, the private-owned 
Zagreb Insurance, has a share of 5.7 per cent. Financial market growth is expected to be spur by the ongoing 
pension system reform. Parallel to EC pension reforms, the Pension Insurance Law was passed in July 1998 
and raised the age of retirement, lengthened the contribution period, reduced the benefit level and changed 
the funding system. The pension system will see the introduction of a compulsory and voluntary insurance 
schemes based on individual capitalised savings; private pensions schemes are expected to be launched in 
2001. Meanwhile EBRD and IFC (World Bank Group) are involved in establishing pension fund 
management companies. Investment funds are regulated by the Investment Fund Act under the supervision 
of the Securities Commission (CROSEC). There are seven investment funds created through voucher 
privatisation of 471 formerly socially owned companies for a total nominal value of 2 billion US$ (1998). 
These funds will be converted to closed-end investment funds by 2004.  
4.2 The equity market.  
The Zagreb Stock Exchange (ZSE) is joint-stock company founded in 1991 by 25 banks and insurance 
companies (presently 40 members). ZSE has three segments: Quotation I and II (official market), where four 
companies’ shares and four bonds are listed, and Quotation TN (Over-The-Counter) for 57 ordinary shares 
and 5 preferred shares. Another relevant OTC market is based in the city of Varazdin. ZSE activities 
expanded during 1997 following economic stabilisation, sovereign debt rating BBB, introduction of an 
exchange index (CROBEX) and privatisation of relevant firms (such as the pharmaceutical Pliva) and banks 
(Zagreb Bank). At end-1997 total turnover was 2.1 billion kuna (1.7 per cent of GDP) with a daily average of 
10.4 million kuna, market capitalisation (26.8 bill. kuna) equalled 21.6 per cent of GDP. In 1998-99 ZSE was 
negatively influenced by the domestic economic environment and by the crisis of emerging markets. In 2000 
ZSE indices regained some momentum: at year-end turnover and market capitalisation can be estimated 
around 1.3 and 14 per cent of GDP respectively, average daily turnover increased from 2.3 to 8.1 million 
kuna and CROBEX stands at 890 (952.5 at mid-June 2001) (Fig.20-21). The development of Croatian stock 
market is hampered by structural bottlenecks. On the supply side incentive for private-owned companies to 
be publicly traded are limited; market remains thin and highly concentrated (Pliva and Zagreb Bank 
represent over 60 per cent of market capitalisation). On the demand side privatisation failed to play a 
catalytic role and household equity investments are still underdeveloped, although the demand could be   44  
increased with the reform of the pension system by local institutional investors. Institutional and regulatory 
fragility must be addressed: financial information should be improved by reinforcing the Company Law and 
the Securities Law; stronger monitoring activities and authority by CROSEC are needed in order to lower 
costs and increase safety of transactions. Fixed-income securities market – which trades mainly Treasury and 
CNB bills – constitutes only a marginal source of financing for government and enterprises. Banks and, to 
some extent, insurance companies are the only players and secondary transactions are very limited. Usually 
banks hold debt instruments until maturity, liquidity being ensured by the transactions between banks and the 
CNB. Furthermore the development of capital markets require better clearing process and payment system. 
4.3 The money market.  
The Zagreb Monetary Market (ZMM) was set up in 1990 under the Money and Capital Market Law as 
a joint-stock company owned by 27 banks and 2 insurance companies. Money market operations are 
organised in three separate segments: the daily interbanking transactions; the overnight market which starts 
after the closing hour of the payment agency (ZAP); the daily direct bilateral transaction among major banks. 
In the first two segments ZMM is the sole broker. Sound banks are reluctant to deal with weaker ones on the 
money market and resource-surplus banks usually hold excess deposits with CNB or lend funds on the 
bilateral market whose participant are mainly strong and sound banks. With the 1998 crisis many banks 
withdrew from ZMM causing liquidity problems; in that occasion interest rates reached 17.5 per cent in 
June, up from 9.4 per cent at end-1997. Since the second quarter of 1999, with the stabilisation of the 
banking sector and the improvement of liquidity condition, interest rates started to decrease reaching 
historical minimum in March 2001 of 3.6 per cent on the daily market and of 2.7 per cent on the overnight 
(Fig.22). Given money market conditions, banks’ liquidity is mainly ensured by CNB lending.  
5. The Payment System 
Croatia had a payment system similar to that of other ex-Yugoslavia countries where National 
Payment Agency (ZAP) played a central role in processing all payments through dedicate accounts. As 
similar reforms currently undertaken by neighbour countries, the functional role of ZAP will be passed to 
banks. In October 2000 a Join CNB-Ministry of Finance Committee was invested to draw a new Domestic 
Payment System Law which will replace the 1993 legislation. For large transaction in April 1999 the 
Croatian Large Value Payment System (CLVPS) was implemented. On February 5, 2001 the National 
Clearing System (NCS) was launched for small value payments transactions. With the NCS interbank 
payments are settled on net multilateral basis; the system is expected to process 300,000 transactions daily. 
Participants in the NCS are banks, saving banks, CNB, ZAP and third parties (institutions which executed 
payment transactions on a contractual basis on behalf and for the account of banks and savings banks). All 
cashless interbank payments are now settled through the CLVPS and the NCS; banks’ daily transit account 
with ZAP are used only for cash payment transactions; CNB maintains the accounts of all banks and savings 
banks. The introduction of NCSentral Bankit is expected is is opreating On February 5 2001, a new National 
Clearing System (NCS) completes the infrastructure needed for the next step of payment system’s reform: 
the transfer of customers accounts from the ZAP to commercial banks.  
 
Croatia: Main Economic Indicators 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 
      
Population (mid year estimation)   4,572,000  4,501,000  4,554,000  4,535,000 
Exchange rate (mid-point  end-year)        
  - Kuna per 1 US$    6.303  6.248  7.648  8.155 
  - Kuna per 1 Euro   6.947  7.329  7.679  7.598 
Gross Domestic Product       
  - current  market price (billion Kuna)   124  138  144  158 
  - current market price ( million US$)   20,107  21,751  20,177  18,908 
  - growth rate (real Kuna)   6.8  2.5  -0.3  3.7 
  - per capita (US$)   4,371  4,663  4,431  4,169 
Current account      
  - Trade Balance (million US$)  -5,196  -4,147  -3,299  -3,237 
  - Current account balance (mill.US$)  -2,325  -1,530  -1,523  -531 
  - Current account balance (% GDP)  -11.4  -7.1  -7.5  -2.5   45  
Unemployment rate (annual  average)       
  - Statistical survey  17.5  17.2  19.1  22.9 
  - ILO definition  9.9  11.4  13.6  15.1 
External debt       
  - million US$   7,452  9,586  9,872  10,876 
  - % GDP   37.1  44.3  49.2  57.5 
  - Tot. Ext. Debt / Export G&S (%)  90.6  111.9  121.6  125.7 
Inflation rate (annual  average)        
  - Retail price   3.6  5.7  4.1  6.2 
Reserves (million  US$)        
  - CNB international reserves   2,539  2,816  3,025  3,525 
  - Banks foreign exchange   2,333  1,949  1,069  2,456 
Overall Budget Balance      
  - million Kuna   -1,587  882  -2,802  -7,697 
  - % GDP   -1.3  0.6  -2.0  -4.9 
M1 (billion Kuna)   14  14  14  18 
  - % GDP   11.1  9.8  9.7  11.7 
M4 (billion Kuna)   51  57  57  73 
  - % GDP   40.9  41.7  39.7  46.6 
Banks' Assets (billion Kuna)   85  93  93  110 
Banks' Loans (billion  Kuna)    45 56 54 59 
  - National currency   36  47  46  52 
  - Foreign currency   9  10  7  7 
  - to enterprises   31  37  31  32 
  - to households   13  18  19  24 
Interbank interest rate (end  period)        
  - daily market   9.3  15.5  12.4  4.5 
  - overnight   8.1  10.0  10.0  3.3 
Banks' rates (average on Kuna)          
  - Credit rate   14.5  16.9  11.7  10.9 
  - Deposit rate    4.4  4.1  4.3  3.6 
CNB's rates       
  - Discount rate   5.9  5.9  7.9  5.9 
  - Lombard rate   9.5  12.0  13.0  12.0 
Zagreb Stock Exchange      
  - Market capitalisation (million Kuna)  26,760  18,276  19,225  22,179 
  - Market capitalisation (% GDP)  21.6  13.2  13.4  14.1 
  - Turnover (million Kuna)   2,095  929  549  1,990 
  - Turnover (% GDP)   1.7  0.7  0.4  1.3 
  - CROBEX   1002  712  715  890 






Fig. 1 GDP Real Growth 























Source: Croatian National Bank 
 
 
Fig. 2 Prices and Wages Developments 



















Nominal wages (right axis)
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Source: Croatian National Bank 
 
Fig. 3 Import and Export of Goods 
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Fig. 4 Balance of Payments Development 





















Fig. 5 Consolidated Central Gov. Budget 
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Fig. 6 Central Gov. Budget: external financing 
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Fig. 7 External Debt by Domestic Sector 






















Gov. and Central Bank
 
Source: Croatian National Bank 
 
Fig. 8 External Debt by Domestic Creditors 












1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Short Term
Long T. (Private Cred.)
Long T. (Public Cred.)
 






Fig. 9 Exchange Rate Developments 
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Source: Croatian National Bank 
 
Fig. 10 Banking Assets  
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Fig. 11 Loans Developments 
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Fig. 12 Loans to Private Domestic Sectors 
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Fig. 14 Foreign Currency Deposit 
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Fig. 15 Banking Ownership Structure 
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Fig. 16 Assets of Top Banks 
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Fig. 17 Average Interest Rates 
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Fig. 19 Bad Loans of Croatian Banks (*) 
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Fig. 20 Stock Exchange: Indices 





























Fig. 21 Stock Exchange 
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COUNTRY PROFILE: FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
∗   
 
1. Economic structure and transition process 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia) was the least developed of the six 
republics that constituted the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), producing less than 5 per 
cent of total output. The economy relied on sizable transfers from the Federation, accounting for 6 per cent 
of the country’s GDP, and was fairly industrialised though it inherited from the system of central planning a 
core of inefficient large scale manufacturing plants designed to provide inputs to factories in other parts of 
the Federation. After independence in 1991 FYR Macedonia experienced a sharp decline in output as a result 
of the loss of subsidies from the Federation, the impact of UN sanctions against Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which cut off the country from traditional markets and transit routes to Central and West 
Europe, and the imposition of a blockade by Greece. In 1995, when output reached the lowest level, real 
GDP was about 36 per cent lower than 1991.  
In 1994-95 the authorities launched a macroeconomic stabilisation program with the support of 
international financial institutions. An exchange-rate targeted monetary policy strategy was pursued, 
choosing the Deutsche Mark as an anchor. The strategy proved successful in restoring price stability and 
inflation was brought down to one of the lowest levels of all transition countries. A tight fiscal stance helped 
reduce the budget deficit to only 0.5 per cent of GDP by the end of 1996. As a part of its transition towards a 
market economy the country undertook a vast program for restructuring and privatisation of socially owned 
enterprises enacting in mid-1993 the Law on Transformation of the Enterprises with Social Capital, even 
though privatisation did not gain momentum until late 1994.  
Following stabilisation and the suspension of the Greek trade embargo and international sanctions 
against Yugoslavia, the Macedonian economy started to recover but growth in 1996-97 was slow partly 
owing to the impact of the collapse of neighboring economies of Bulgaria and Albania. In 1996 the 
authorities liberalised the trade system by dismantling the import quotas and reducing tariffs. In response to 
the liberalisation of trade and increased economic activities import growth picked up in 1997 while exports 
stagnated due to the erosion of competitiveness. The country’s external position came under increasing 
pressure and in July the exchange rate was devalued by 14 per cent against DM. The inflationary impact of 
the devaluation was neutralised through a six months wage freeze and a tight fiscal policy. Economic growth 
accelerated to 2.9 per cent in 1998, the highest growth since independence. In the first half of 1999 the 
economy suffered the impact of the Kosovo crisis, but with the end of the conflict economic activity picked 
up sharply and GDP was slightly lower than the previous years (2.7 per cent).  
In the second half of 1990s progress was made in implementing the privatisation program even though 
the outcome in terms of enterprises restructuring and financial performance was below expectations. As of 
November 2000 1,604 enterprises have been privatised, mostly through management and employee buyouts, 
leaving 123 enterprises still awaiting privatisation. Enterprises sold to private outside investors accounted for 
about 18 per cent of the privatisation undertaken as of November 2000, of which about 10 percentage point 
went to foreigner investors. Most of the enterprises privatised are SMEs while only initial steps have been 
made for restructuring and privatisation of state-owned utilities and largest lossmakers. Lack of financial 
discipline and adequate corporate governance arrangement, partly owing to the predominance of insider 
privatisation, have resulted in widespread enterprise losses and a build-up of inter-enterprises arrears and 
non-performing loans in the banking system. Delays in reforming the legislative framework for creditors’ 
rights have also undermined the imposition of hard budget constraint limiting the ability of creditors to 
enforce their claims. 
2. Institutional aspects 
2.1 Legal framework of banking activities 
FYR Macedonia became an independent currency area at the end of April 1992. In 1993 the Banks 
and Saving Houses Act was enacted which introduced the basic rules for establishing banks and set base 
capital requirements for conducting banking activities. The law regulated two types of deposit institutions: 
banks, operating in a broad range of activities other than performing the traditional function of collecting 
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deposits and extending credit, and saving houses with scope of activities mainly limited to households. 
Minimum capital requirements were raised in the 1996 amendment to the Act which also introduced tighter 
prudential regulations concerning credit exposure to single debtors and related party lending. To strengthen 
depositors’ confidence in the banking system the amendment provided also for the establishment of a 
Deposit Insurance Fund which was set up in January 1997 as a joint stock company owned by all banks and 
saving houses allowed to accept personal deposits. During the first half of 2000 the legislation in the banking 
area has undergone considerable changes. A new Banking law aimed at harmonising the legal framework 
with European Directives as well as achieving higher compliance with the Basle Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision was enacted. The new Law sets the minimum capital requirement for 
conducting banking activities at 3.5 million Euro, raised to 9 million Euro to perform payment or credit 
activities with non resident or trading in securities, foreign currency and financial derivatives. The new Law 
contains also provisions aimed at strengthening corporate governance, risk management and internal auditing 
in banks and provides the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia (NBRM) with a wide variety of 
corrective actions to enable early intervention and resolution of failing banks. To strengthen monitoring and 
enforcement activities the NBRM has recently reorganised the Supervision Department establishing two 
separate units for off-site monitoring and handling problem banks. The Law on the Deposit Insurance Fund 
enacted in 2000 provided that the current bank-owned and operated system is to be replaced by mid-2001 
with a government-backed insurance scheme.  
In 1997 was enacted the Law on Issuance and Trading of Securities which laid down the basic 
regulatory framework for the securities market and provided the regulatory body, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, with broad regulatory and supervisory authority. The securities regulation has been 
extensively revised in the first half of 2000 with the enactment of a new Law on Securities and the Law on 
Investment Funds. 
2.2 The structure of the banking system and financial system 
Banks have a central position in the country’s financial system as other segments are still at the 
starting phase of their development. The banking system comprises 21 banks, 1 foreign bank branch and 19 
saving houses. Of the total number of banks 15 and the foreign bank branch have a full license allowing for 
both domestic and foreign operations. The structural relations between the two segments of the banking 
system shows that banks, with a share of 98.9 per cent of the total assets, play a dominant role in the process 
of intermediation relative to saving houses. Bank privatisation has proceeded gradually over 1990s mainly 
trough the privatisation of existing shareholders and as of June 2000 80.4 per cent of banking capital was 
privatised. During the first half of 2000 the presence of foreign investors has significantly increased owing to 
the acquisition of 85 per cent of share capital of Stopanska Banka, the country’s largest bank with a share of 
36.5 per cent of total banks’ assets, by National Bank of Greece in consortium with IFC and EBRD. As of 
June 2000 the share of foreign capital in total bank capital was 33.3 per cent, 14 percentage point higher than 
the end of 1999. 
The Macedonian Stock Exchange (MSE) was founded in 1995 and commenced trading in 1996. 
Trading on MSE is conducted on three markets, the first two officials while the third has features of an OTC 
market. In 1999 there were 114 securities traded but only two companies were listed on the official market 
while most activities took place on the third market. Clearings for trades on all three tiers is undertaken by 
MSE while settlement of transactions in listed companies is carried out by the PBO. In the third market the 
settlement is delivery versus payment organised bilaterally between  brokers. According to the Law on 
Securities December 2003 all transaction in securities not listed on the official market have to be executed 
on the MSE third market. The total turnover in 1999 was denar 1.5 billion or roughly DM 50 million. A 
money and short-term securities market has been active since November 1997.  
2.3 Monetary policy 
The NBRM is responsible for designing and conducting the monetary policy on the basis of the targets 
and objectives set annually by the Parliament. The main monetary policy objective is the maintenance of 
price stability which since the mid-1990s has been pursued by pegging the Denar exchange rate against the 
Deutsche Mark. From April 2000 the NBRM has moved from direct credit ceilings to a system of monetary 
control based mainly on the use of indirect instruments, in the form of open market auctions of central bank 
bills.    51
3. The banking system structure and performance 
3.1 Transition process in the banking system 
At independence the Macedonian banking system comprised 5 banks, with the largest accounting for 
65 per cent of total bank’s asset. In order to change market structure and foster competition, the NBRM set 
low minimum capital requirements, thus supporting the establishment of 13 new banks by the end of 1993. 
The shocks associated with the break-up of the former SFRY and weak financial discipline in the enterprise 
sector had a severe impact on banking soundness, leading to the accumulation of a high amount of non-
performing loans, whose share of credit portfolios reached an estimated level of 80 per cent in 1994. In order 
to address the problem of banking system soundness in 1995 the Government adopted an extensive program 
for the rehabilitation and restructuring of the sector with a total cost equivalent to 12.1 per cent of GDP. This 
comprised the cleaning of banks’ balance sheets with the transfer of non-performing foreign currency debts 
of socially and state-owned enterprises to the Bank Rehabilitation Agency, the liquidation of four banks and 
a first round of financial restructuring of Stopanska Banka, with the replacement of non performing denar-
denominated loans with Government Bonds and, in order to create greater competition in the system, the 
reduction of the size of the bank trough spinning off the five major branches which were transformed into 
independent commercial banks. The restructuring of the mid-1990s has not prevented the recurrence of new 
banking problems owing in part to shortcomings in supervision. In 1997-98 saving houses were closed 
including TAT, the country’s largest saving houses, which was running a pyramid scheme and was found to 
have about DM 100 million in unreported deposits, equivalent to 12 per cent of total deposits in the banking 
system. In the second half of 1998 Stopanska Banka’s liquidity position began to deteriorate and in 1999 the 
bank became technically insolvent, repeatedly failing to meet the minimum reserve requirement. After the 
replacement of bad debts equivalent to 3.5 per cent of GDP with Government Bonds, in 2000 Stopanska 
Banka has been sold to a consortium of foreigner investors  
3.2 Development indicators and market structure 
The level of financial intermediation of the banking system of FYR of Macedonia is relatively low 
compared to some of the leading countries in transition economies. At the end of 1999 total assets 
represented 37 per cent of GDP, with an increase of 9.5 percentage point if compared to the end of 1997. The 
amount of deposits of the non-banking institutions and individuals in term of GDP was 20.9 per cent at the 
end of 1999. Lending to private sector has been crippled by the low level of intermediation, lack of financial 
discipline and poor allocation of credit. The ratio of credit to social and private sector to GDP at the end of 
1999 equalled 18 per cent. Notwithstanding several efforts of the authorities to foster competition, the 
banking system is highly concentrated and the indicators of market concentration showed a slight growth in 
the first half of 2000. At end-June 2000, the first three largest banks accounted for 64.5 per cent of total 
balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities and the share of the largest banks was 38.8 per cent. The share 
of the off-balance sheet activities was 17 per cent of the total scope of banking operation and the largest bank 
had a share of 50.1 per cent in the total volume of off-balance sheet activities.  
3.3 Risks and efficiency 
Following the restructuring program in 1995, loan collection rates have improved but low credit 
quality still remains a major problem in the banking sector. The total amount of claims and off-balance 
sheets items classified in Substandard, Doubtful and Loss categories , which represented 44 per cent of 
banks’ total credit exposure at the end of December 1995, dropped at 33 per cent at the end of 1998, but 
during 1999 the quality of loan portfolio deteriorated again and at the end of December non-performing 
loans accounted for 41 per cent of credit portfolio. In the first half of 2000 the quality of loan portfolios 
slightly improved and as of end-June non-performing loans represented 39 per cent of total credit exposure 
and Doubtful and Loss debt alone accounted for 24 per cent of credit portfolio. Net of loan loss provisions, 
non-performing claims represented 18 per cent of total credit portfolio and 59 per cent of the guaranteed 
capital of banks. Low level of intermediation, high concentration of the market and low quality of loan 
portfolio have resulted in very high interest rates. The average weighted nominal lending rate in the first half 
of 2000 was 18.8 per cent while the weighted deposit rate equaled 11.3 per cent. The spread between lending 
and deposits rates was thus 7.5 percentage points but has remained high at about 8-10 per cent in recent 
years. Despite high nominal interest rate margins, profitability in the banking system has been weak and 
declining in recent years. In 1999 the rate of Return on Assets was 0.8 per cent and 1.2 percentage point   52
lower than the previous year. Net interest income after provisions was negative, reflecting an implicit 
subsidy to outstanding non performing debtors. The ratio between loan loss provision and net interest income 
amounted in 1999 to 1.59. In the first half of 2000 the profitability has slightly improved and the Return on 
Assets equaled 1.3 per cent. 
4. The payment system 
Cash payments are very widely used. At the end of 1999 banknotes and coins represented about the 41 
per cent of M1 monetary aggregate and 4.1 of GDP. Most pensions are paid in cash and there is a wide 
practice of paying wages in cash, both in the private and public sector. Almost all retail transaction are also 
made in cash owing to the insufficient development of non-cash payment instrument such as credit and debit 
card and the small number of POS. 
As in other former SFRY countries the payment non cash payments involving legal entities are 
processed trough a Bureau for Payment Operation (ZPP).The existing BPO payment arrangement is expected 
to be replaced by the end of 2001 with an RTGS system operated by the NBRM and a clearing house for 
small value payment owned and operated by commercial banks.   53
FYR Macedonia: Main Indicators 
 
  1997 1998 1999 
    
Population (thousands persons, mid- year 
estimation) 
1996.9 2007.5  2020.0 
Exchange rate (average annual rates)     
- Denar per 1 U.S. dollar  49.83  54.45  56.90 
- Denar per 1 DM  28.70  30.95  30.99 
Gross Domestic Product     
- current price (millions of denars) (a)  184,982  190,827  195,284 
- current price (billions of U.S. dollars) (b)  3,707  3,469  3,566 
- constant price (millions of denar - at constant 
1995 market prices) (a) 
174,000 179,120  183,908 
- growth rate (real denar)(a)  1.4  2.9  2.7 
- per capita (in U.S. dollars)(b)  1,693  1,574  1,608 
Current account      
- Trade balance (in millions of U.S. dollars) (a)  -386  -418  -409 
- Current account balance (in millions of U.S. 
dollars) (a) 
-286 -307 -136 
- Current account balance –excluding grants (in 
millions of U.S. dollars) (a) 
-283 -335 -201 
- Current account balance (in percent of 
GDP)(a) 
-7.4 -8.8 -4.0 
- Current account balance – excluding grants(in 
percent of GDP)(a) 
-7.6 -9.6 -5.9 
Unemployment rate (b)  36.0 34.5 32.4 
External debt     
- in percent of GDP (a)  31.6  41.1  43.3 
- Debt service ratio (Debt service due as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services (a) 
8.7 10.1 13.0 
Consumer prices (annual average)(a)  2.6 -0.1 -0.7 
General government balance (in percent of 
GDP)(a) 
-0.4 -1.8 -0.1 
M1 (million of Denar) (a)  13,985 15,178  19,694 
- in percent of GDP (a)  7.6  8.0  10.1 
M2 (million of Denar)(a)  22,010 25,375  32,837 
- in percent of GDP (a)  11,9  13,3  16,8 
M3 (million of Denar)(a)  25,778 29,461  38,103 
- in percent of GDP(a)  13.9  15.4  19.5 
Banks' assets  50,912 58,260  72,279 
- in percent of GDP(a)  27.5  30.5  37.0 
Macedonia Stock Exchange     
- Turnover (millions of denars) (a)  1,101  4,476  1,552.8 
- Turnover (in percent of GDP) (a)  0.6  2.4  0.8 
Sources: National Authorities (a) and IFM (b).   54  55
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1. Transition process 
In 1998 the macroeconomic performance of Romania has been the worst amongst the countries that 
applied for the accession into the EU. After a steady growth during 1993-96, GDP has sharply decreased. 
This fact, jointly with the precarious political situation, impelled the IMF to suspend the third tranche of the 
loan granted in 1997, while international rating agencies downgraded the country. 
At present, the priorities of the Government are the reduction of inflation, privatisation and reduction 
of the budget deficit. 
All quantitative restrictions on exports were eliminated by 1998 and replaced with licensing 
requirements for monitoring purposes. However, the Government introduced a temporary import surcharge 
by the end of 1998 that has been progressively reduced and finally eliminated. Capital inflows are as of now 
without restrictions, while outflow by residents requires prior approval of the NBR. 
Sustainable stabilisation, after the turbulence of 1998, strongly depends on tightening public finances 
(whose bad performance was the major cause of economic default). Amongst required measures there is the 
confiscation of state-owned bank balances, the closure of public loss-making enterprises and a throughout 
reform of tax system that will fill the gap determined by the lack of personal income tax (the actual fiscal 
regime relies excessively on indirect taxation). Some recent Government initiatives, to be submitted to the 
Parliament in the next future, move towards this end. 
Both small-scale and large-scale privatisation accelerated during 1998 and 1999. Moreover the new 
privatisation law approved by Parliament in June 1999, allows explicitly for the use of investment banks as 
share sales agent, admits share sales at market value (eliminating the minimum sale prices linked to book 
value imposed by the former legal framework) and contains provisions for debt workouts. 
2. Institutional aspects 
The National Bank of Romania (NBR) is an independent Central Bank whose main goal is to ensure 
the stability of the domestic currency in order to fight inflation. It has also licensing and supervisory powers 
on the banking system. 
The legal framework for the banking sector was significantly strengthened in 1998 with the adoption 
of three laws: on banking activity, on the Statute of the NBR and on bank bankruptcy. A law on money 
laundering has also been established in late 1998. 
Moreover, due to the cited turbulence of the financial sector, in June 2000 the two budget-finance 
Commissions of the Parliament decided to set up a sub-commission (composed by seven members of the 
Parliament) to review the legislation which governs the capital market in Romania. According to his mandate 
the commission should present in September proposals for improving capital market legislation.  
Romania is amongst the three south-eastern European economies (with Albania and Yugoslavia FYR) 
that opted for a monetary policy rule based on money growth target to maintain price stability (this implies a 
floating exchange rate regime).  
3. The banking system 
3.1 Market structure 
In 1998 in Romania was registered 47 commercial banks (36 of which national entities were 
registred). Eleven were branches of foreign banks. Among the remaining, seven banks were state-owned, 
five were constituted with private domestic capital, eight were founded with private foreign capital and 16 
were totally private (with foreign and/or domestic capital). 
As of now there are 35 authorised banks in Romania and seven branches of foreign banks, out of 
which 33 are covered in the assessment and classification system of the NBR, the exception being the 
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Investment and Development Bank that has been authorised but has not started his activity yet, and the 
Agricultural Bank which has been recently privatised after a series of unsuccessful attempts (at the last 
deadline for the submission of offers, September 2000, a bid has been finally been received: the consortium 
made up of the Agricultural Bank of Greece, Rabobank and the Romanian-American Enterprise Fund, which 
had previously stated its intention to buy the 56.5 per cent , submitted a formal offer). The privatisation of 
the Agricultural Bank is one of the conditions the Government undertook to fulfill within the IMF stand-by 
agreement. A special role is played by CEC, a saving bank which is organised as a public limited company 
and regulated by a special law: it operates now on a extended range of banking activity with a large degree of 
independence with respect to NBR supervision and control. 
Since 1996 other institutions, the so-called credit cooperatives, can provide banking services. 
Nevertheless it was well known the need to proceed to regulate their activity, the Credit Cooperatives have 
operated outside the authority control of the NBR since June, 2000. In May, 2000, the largest mutual fund, 
the National Investment Fund (FNI) collapsed due to a fraud. The subsequent turbulence on domestic 
financial markets and the declining trust and withdrawals forced the largest credit cooperative (Banca 
Populara Romana) to announce in June the suspension of payments for at least six months.  
Since 1990 the number of banks has increased by almost ten times, even if the quantity and quality of 
banking products and services still remains low compared to industrialised countries. This is explained by 
several factors: 
1)  although the number of banks rapidly increased and some of the state-owned banks where privatised at 
the end of 1998, the Romanian banking system still has an high degree of concentration and 
segmentation; 
2)  the weakness of some state-owned banks and the hesitation of the authorities to let them fail created an 
excellent profit-making opportunity for lending to banks with chronic liquidity problems; 
3)  the great amount of Treasury Bills issued by the Government at high interest rates (mainly after 1996), 
has ensured a further low-risk profit opportunity for the banks; 
4)  Romanian financial markets are thin, banks are not significantly involved either in the insurance market 
or in the capital market, and even now there is no mortgage market. 
As a consequence the banking activity is generally not customer-oriented, even if recently some 
commercial bank has made headway by introducing some modern instrument, such as Internet banking. 
Nevertheless, card-based payment schemes are not yet widespread. Moreover, there are no interbank 
networks or service providers for ATMs that have only cash dispenser functions. 
As regards concentration four state-owned banks (Bancorex, Romanian Commercial Bank, Romanian 
Bank for Development and Agriculture Bank) and the saving bank CEC dominate the market: the four banks 
account for 62 per cent of the market and CEC 10 per cent (in terms of total assets). 
There are three main segments of banking activity: 
1)  big state-owned banks engaged in the financing of state-owned companies and the public sector; 
2)  foreign banks especially devoted to serve the major foreign companies operating in Romania; 
3)  small banks with foreign and/or domestic capital more oriented towards lending to private companies. 
It is likely that, due to recent developments, the situation is going to evolve towards a more 
competitive environment, although no evidence is yet available to confirm it. 
3.2 Performance 
The scale of banking (in terms of both broad money and total domestic credit to the private sector) is 
significantly lower than in most advanced economies of central and Western Europe. Bank lending in 
Romania is more short-term oriented: evidence shows that banks have achieved only modest progress in 
expanding the maturity of their lending. 
The profitability of Romanian banks, measured as the ratio of net profits before taxes to total assets, 
for the 1991-98 period has been, on average, of 4.4 per cent , far above the 2.6 of banks in transition 
economies in the years 1993-97 and 0.7 per cent in the OECD countries for the years 1993-95.   57
The net interest margin scaled by total assets has shown over time a slow decline from 6.3 per cent in 
1994 to -2.2 per cent in 1998 (the latter figure due to the liquidity problems of two state-owned banks 
(Bancorex and Banca Agricola), that had borrowed significantly from the interbank market. 
The financial soundness of Romanian banks, measured by the ratio of equity to total assets, has 
fluctuated widely: starting from a 6.5 per cent in 1991, it reached a peak of 12 per cent in 1995 and fell down 
in the following years to 7.6 per cent in 1998. By comparison, for the years 1993-97, the average ratio in 
transition countries was 9.6 per cent and, in general, over time across transition countries there was an 
upward trend. Therefore Romania is an exception among transition economies. 
Customer orientation remains low due to the dominance of state-owned banks and the moral hazard 
arising from a regulatory legislation that appears too permissive. An improvement of customer care appear 
necessary to solve the under-provision problems shown by the system. 
In August 2000 the interest rate for bank lending to the non banking sector went down on average to 
50 per cent on an annual basis from 62 per cent in December, 1999, while the June 2000 deposit rates stood 
close to 30 per cent . 
Consequently the gap between lending and deposit rates went down. In June 2000 the average interest 
rate on Treasury Bills stood in the primary market at 44 per cent , down from 72 per cent in December 1999. 
4. Money and financial markets 
In accordance with its Statute, the NBR acts as the agent of the State Treasury. Accordingly, the NBR 
can sell Treasury bills or other negotiable papers issued by the State. The BNR performs the registry and 
depository functions for these securities. At present the NBR and Ministry of Finance are working on a 
project to create a secondary market for Government securities, in order to provide the banks with a facility 
enabling them to have access to liquidity based on market conditions and to allow the central bank to pursue 
monetary policy objectives through open market operations. However it is not yet clear if these securities 
will be traded on one of the two existing security markets (see below), or on a third market created ad hoc. 
In 1994 the Parliament approved the new Securities and Stock Exchanges Act, the legal framework 
required to establish a modern capital market. The Bucharest Stock Exchange was set up by the decision of 
the National Securities Commission. Although a public entity, the market is effectively managed by its 
members, initially 24 securities companies that formed the Stock Exchange association. 
The Exchange can adopt rules and regulations regarding registration of members, listing standards, 
trading mechanisms, transfer and clearing activities and registry activities according to the delegation of 
powers extended by the National Securities Commission. 
Currently, there are 96 members, out of which 12 were set up as securities subsidiaries of commercial 
banks. According to the Securities Act, Banks cannot engage directly in securities business but can set up 
securities subsidiaries. However, the Exchange is an open institution, therefore membership is not restricted 
to a limited number of participants. 
Foreign securities companies can act in the Romanian market only through a subsidiary subject to 
Romanian law. Foreign banks will be subject to the same requirements provided they already have or set up 
a securities subsidiary. 
Subsequently to the mass privatisation program and the investment opportunities deriving from it, at 
the end of 1996 another stock market was inaugurated, the RASDAQ (Romanian Association of Security 
Dealers Automated Quotation) built after the model of the American over-the-counter NASDAQ. The aim of 
the new authorities was to offer a possibility to acquire great or majority stakes, in order to increase the 
interest of strategic investors looking for the control of the companies whose shares was traded on the 
markets. The number of traded companies has rapidly increased to over 2000.  
No discrimination exists againts foreign investors in the securities market: only repatriation of profits 
requires a clearing authorisation from the NBR. At the present there is no capital gain tax. 
5. The payment system 
5.1 Overview   58
Since 1995 the payment system in Romania has undergone a broad process of modernisation, 
improvement and diversification, developed in accordance with the fundamental changes in the Romanian 
financial and banking system that have occurred during this period and in accordance with the 
implementation of monetary policy goals. One result has been a gradual shift in the relative importance of 
the various payment services and instruments in the Romanian banking industry. The current Romanian 
payment system is the result of the enforcement between 1992 and 1998 of a homogeneous legal framework, 
based on the new banking laws. This new law gives commercial banks and the State Treasury the right to 
issue and manage the payment media and explicitly designate the NBR as the regulatory authority of the 
payment system, with the aim of increase competition and thus improve the quality of banking payment 
services as well as risk monitoring features. As a result from April 1995 in Romania operates an interbank 
payment system, denominated DECONT-BNR which is fully owned and managed by the central bank. All 
commercial banks licensed by the NBR as well as other financial institutions that provide banking 
intermediation are participants with equal rights and obligations. 
5.2 Payment media used by non-banks 
Cash. The monetary unit in Romania is the ROL. The NBR, through a network of 41 branches, 
distributes and collect banknotes that, together with coins, are the most widely used retail payment media in 
Romania (61 per cent of M1 as at the end of August 1998).  
Non cash. Subsequently to the establishment of DECONT-NBR the volume of non-cash payments has 
been constantly increasing during recent years. 
Credit transfers. The payment order is the most commonly used cashless payment instrument. 
According to NBR disposals a credit transfer may be performed either in paper-based form or electronically. 
At the present all interbank payments are paper-based and only 1 per cent of intrabank payments is 
electronically performed. At present all paper-based retail payment orders (value less than ROL 500 
millions) are cleared and settled in one of the 42 NBR clearing houses (within a time that averaged in 3.67 
days). All money wholesale orders with a higher value, mainly issued by enterprises, are settled through the 
NBR network on the day of issuance. 
Cheques are less used in interbank payments than payment orders (in 1997 were settled, on average, 
9.157 interbank cheques each day). All crossed cheques (with the exception of those for which the drawee 
bank is the NBR) are cleared on a multilateral basis. The cheques for which the drawee bank is the NBR are 
bilaterally netted and settled in the current accounts of the commercial bank held by the central bank. Due to 
the higher risk, and higher administrative costs in order to prevent fraud and losses, the time it takes the bank 
to credit funds is higher than for credit transfer (on average 5.16 days). Direct debits, although regulated by 
NBR, are still not widely used by national banks (some branches of foreign banks offers their customer 
services based on this mean of payment. 
Payment cards. From 1992 six Romanian commercial banks became VISA members and started 
accepting transaction made by using cards issued in foreign countries. Since 1997 currency-denominated 
card are issued by a small number of commercial bank under the VISA or Europay logo. 
At the present there are only debit cards usually with the only function of cash withdrawal and, in some 
cases, of debit function at POS. 
All transactions, transmitted electronically by banks or ROMCARD, are cleared by VISA or Europay 
processing centers (ROMCARD is a joint stock company established by five of the most important banks 
specialised in transmitting these transaction). On the basis of agreements signed both with VISA and 
Europay, the NBR is the final settlement agent. In Romania there are no interbank networks for ATMs and 
POS. ATMs have only cash dispenser function and they are managed by the issuing bank. The Romanian 
Post administers (only for cash transfer because it does not hold accounts for customers) the postal money 
order, recently offered with the new option of instant (real-time) transfer. Accepted, but negligible, means of 
payments are also bills of exchange and promissory notes. 
5.3 Interbank exchange and settlement systems 
At present the NBR is the only interbank payment operator and it provides the final settlements for 
nearly all the interbank cashless payments in Romania through its payment system, DECONT-NBR. The 
architecture of DECONT-NBR comprises three interbank exchange and settlement subsystems running   59
intraday. All commercial bank are allowed to take part directly in the operations of the interbank exchange 
and settlement subsystems, while indirect participation (sub-participation) in DECONT-NBR is not 
permitted at present. A comprehensive scheme of the actual Romanian payment system (taken from the ECB 
Blue Book on Payments systems of countries that have applied for membership of the EU) has been reported 
above. The gross settlement subsystem was created in December 1995 and since then has undergone several 
changes according to evolution of banking system in Romania. At present the direct participants in this 
subsystem are the following: 46 bank headquarters and the State Treasury, at the NBR headquarters as well 
as 541 bank branches and 47 State Treasury branches, at the local branches of the NBR. As of now the gross 
settlement subsystem processes on daily basis the following categories of payments: 
1)  State Treasury large-values (more than ROL 500 millions) transfers; 
2)  interbank large-value (more than ROL 500 millions) transfers ordered by the customers of the banks; 
3)  interbank transfers related to the treasury bills primary markets, money and foreign exchange markets. 
The gross settlement subsystem operates on an end-of-day gross settlements basis because the 
payment orders are processed one by one throughout the day, while final settlement is performed on a gross 
basis at the end of the day (there is no credit or liquidity risks involved because the payment orders are 
settled only if sufficient funds are available on the current account of the senders). The NBR is looking for 
implement S.W.I.F.T. standards to process the real time gross settlements of cross-border credit transfers. 
The net settlement subsystem consists of three components: 
1)  multilateral clearing with net settlement of interbank payments; 
2)  bilateral clearing with net settlement of low-value transactions related to State Treasury or the NBR; 
3)  multilateral clearing of interbank payments with net settlement performed by clearing houses other than 
those owned by the NBR.  
In April 1995 the NBR started to operate its own clearing network consisting of 41 district interbank 
clearing houses (one in each NBR branch) and one interbank clearing house located at the NBR 
headquarters. All the commercial banks, including the CEC, participate directly in the clearing procedures 
with no more than one of their branches in each district of the country (541 commercial banks branches 
currently participate in the clearing and settlement project).At present the net settlement subsystem also 
provide final settlements and multilateral clearing operations in the RASDAQ. 
There is also a special settlement subsystem designed to carry out daily, on a gross basis, all the fund 
transfers related to insolvent banks. This subsystem functions on the basis of regulations issued by the NBR 
on a case-by-case basis, according to the decision taken by the NBR board regarding the particular banks 
being subjected to a legal insolvency procedure or a special supervision procedure of the central bank.   60  61
COUNTRY PROFILE: SLOVENIA 
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1. The economic structure 
1.1 Economic background (1992-97)  
After independence (June 1991) Slovenia recorded a fairly balanced economic growth with real GDP 
increasing in the range of 5.3 (1994) and 3.5 (1996) per cent (Fig.1). The main goals of monetary policy, 
price and exchange rate stability, were reached in 1993-95 (Fig.2). Trade flows were redirected away from 
other FYR and the already high degree of integration into the European economic system increased. 
Notwithstanding trade deficits, current account showed surplus in 1994 and remained balanced until 1998 
(Fig.3-4). Monetary policy was extremely prudent while fiscal policy was moderately expansive and income 
policy almost neutral. In 1997 central government budget started to show deficits but external financing was 
gradually reduced (Fig.5-6). In 1994-97 total external debt increased to 23 per cent of GDP and to 38 per 
cent of exports of goods and services; external debt service represented 8.5 per cent of goods and services’ 
exports while total foreign exchange reserves declined, equalling external debt in 1997 (Fig.7-8). In terms of 
imports of goods, foreign exchange reserves at the Central bank were equal to 1.8 month of imports in 1993 
and increased to 4.4 months in 1998. Economic growth slowed in 1995-96 either for the weakening of 
external demand and for domestic bottlenecks caused by the slow implementation of structural reforms, 
privatisation programs and financial restructuring in the industrial sector.  
 
1.2 Recent developments (1998-2000)  
In 1998 economic growth was fuelled by domestic investment and external demand. Low interest 
rates, strong corporate retained earnings and productivity gains fuelled domestic investment while exports 
were helped by the strong demand of trading partners and by the real depreciation of the tolar (Fig.9). By 
end-1998 real GDP growth was at 3.9 per cent. In the first half of 1999 exports were affected by the 
slowdown of Western economies, crisis in Croatia and Russia and, to a limited extend, by the Kosovo war. 
In advance of the introduction of VAT (July 1999), imports recorded an upsurge as well as domestic 
investment and consumption demand. Coupled with the recovery of external demand, at year-end the real 
GDP growth was slightly above 5 per cent but external imbalances emerged: a wide trade deficit and a small 
service surplus led to a current account deficit equal to 2.9 per cent of GDP. Inflation rate continued 
declining until mid-1999 when introduction of VAT and world energy prices increases generated new 
pressures until mid-2000: at December 2000 CPI increased by 8.9. In 1999 Government budget deficit was 
reduced to 0.6 per cent of GDP but it increased again in year 2000 (1.4 per cent of GDP). In year 2000 GDP 
recorded a growth of 4.8 per cent; average inflation rate was around 11 per cent; current account deficit 
expanded at 3.3 per cent of GDP. External debt increased at 6,2 billion US$ (31 per cent of GDP) 66 per cent 
covered by foreign exchange reserves. In 2001-02 GDP growth is expected to be around 4.5 per cent, current 
account imbalances should remain above 3 per cent of GDP, unemployment rate should be around 7 per cent 
(it was 7.9 and 7.2 per cent in 1999 and 2000 respectively). Inflation rate should decrease at 8 per cent in 
2001 and 5 per cent in 2002; general government deficit should decrease at 1.3 per cent of GDP. 
2. Institutional Aspects 
2.1 Legal framework of banking and financial activities.  
With the enforcement of the Europe Association Agreement (February 1999) Slovenia committed, 
within a transitional period, to liberalise the movements of goods, labour force, capital and services and to 
open the property market. With the new Banking Law (20.2.1999) legal framework is substantially 
harmonised with most of the EU banking and financial directives especially those concerning with the rules 
of establishment, prudential regulations and supervision. For some requirements – such as the acquisition of 
bank’s shares, capital investment in non-financial institution, large exposure and deposit guarantees – there is 
an up to three years adjustment period; for other requirement – such as single license, home country control 
and cross-border provision of services – the are phased-in provisions which will be valid until Slovenia’s 
accession to the EU. Competition in the banking sector should be fostered by the liberalisation of foreign 
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banks’ branches and the set up of banks by foreign legal entities and natural persons. Bank of Slovenia 
(BoS), established in June 1991, is a non-governmental independent institution; it is obliged to report before 
the Parliament twice a year. Central bank’s primary task is the stability of domestic currency and to ensure 
the liquidity of payments within the country and with foreign countries; it is also in charge of the supervision 
of banks but not of other non-banks financial intermediaries. For insurance activities the Europe Association 
Agreement envisaged a transition period and therefore the basic 1994 Law on Insurance Companies has not 
changed yet. This law imposes some restriction on foreign entities: insurance companies can be founded only 
with domestic capital participation and if a company is controlled by foreign capital it can only operate in 
some segment of the insurance market. In the area of capital movement, a new Foreign Exchange Law was 
enforced in September 1999, subsequently revised on February and May 2000. Under the new regime, 
restrictions on foreign direct investment applies only in few sectors (armaments, health and pension 
insurance, auditing and media); free movement of capital applies also to profits, to investment results, to 
loans for commercial transactions and to the provision of services and financial loans. BoS implemented new 
regulations easing restrictions on capital flows. 
2.2 The structure of the banking and financial systems 
Banks are the main sources of credit, other segments of the Slovenian financial system are relatively 
under-developed. As of end-1999 there were 25 banks, six saving banks and 68 credit and loan undertakings. 
By the first half of 2000 the number of banks has increased by one with the establishment of a foreign bank’s 
branch. The market shares of the savings banks (0.4 per cent) and credit and loans undertakings (1.7 per 
cent) are structurally small. Foreign presence, from Austria and Germany, represents a small portion of the 
market. The banking sector is highly concentrated and is dominated by State-owned intermediaries. The 
Ljubljana Stock Exchange (LSE) was founded in December 1989 and it is currently under the Law on 
Securities Market. The structure of LSE and trading procedures resemble the Anglo-Saxon model of capital 
market; OTC market was opened in 1995; futures trading started in 1996. Mass privatisation procedures – 
mainly focused on primary distribution of shares to eligible groups of owners – caused imbalances in the 
capital markets with few buyers and many sellers. In 1994-97 period there were few cash public offerings 
with newly issued securities subscribed mostly by banks. Moreover capital market development suffered 
from BoS’s cautious stance regarding foreign currency inflow aimed at exchange rate and price stability. The 
insurance market is substantially sheltered from international competition. At end-1999 there were 12 
insurance companies and three reinsurance companies; the presence of foreign capital is negligible. As the 
banking sector, even insurance market is highly concentrated –the top four companies cover 88 per cent of 
the market – with a strong public participation. Two State funds provide voluntary health and pension 
insurance; the Slovenian Export Corporation provides insurance for export activities. Other financial 
intermediaries include 46 Authorised Investment Companies managed by 22 management companies – 
collecting ownership certificate and issuing shares sold by the Slovenian Development Corporation (the 
national agency for privatisation) – and two investment funds: the Slovenian Development Capital Fund, the 
first equity fund operating since June 1995, which provides long-term financing to private, medium-size 
enterprises and the Horizont Fund, sponsored by an Austrian-American venture management group, which 
provides venture capital and management assistance to small and medium-size private companies with high 
growth and export potential.  
2.3 Monetary policy 
The BoS policies are aimed at lowering inflation and maintaining price stability; its intermediate target 
is the growth of M3. After an initial liberalisation, during 1995-98 BoS restored heavy restrictions on foreign 
capital inflows in order to control exchange rate level and volatility. The efficiency of BoS monetary policy 
was hindered by the poor performance of the interbank market and the small size of the money market. 
Given the limited competition among banks, interest rates on the interbank market are driven by liquidity 
needs of few big players; the lack of short-term government debt securities limited the development of the 
money market. Moreover there was a cartel agreement among banks imposing a ceiling on deposit interest 
rates. In 1999 monetary policy operations improved with the abolishment of the cartel agreement and most 
controls on capital flows and the issue of Treasury bill with short and medium-term maturities. Besides 
imposing administrative controls, the BoS can manage forex exchange either issuing forex bills and 
intervening directly on the market with short-term repurchase operations. The growth of M3 is controlled by 
the issue of domestic currency (tolar) bills with different maturities, by imposing different reserve   63
requirements on tolar and foreign currency and by using a range of lending facilities (Lombard, short-term 
and liquidity loans). BoS is currently implementing a program of de-indexation of monetary medium-term 
instruments: a 270-day bill at nominal interest rate was issued on September 1999; three-month Treasury bill 
are now de-indexed; a 6-month de-indexed bill was issued in October 1999.  
3. The Banking System 
3.1 Development of the banking system.  
At the end of 2000 total assets of the Slovenian banking sector equalled 3,3 billion tolar (14,4 billion 
US$); since 1996 the annual rate of growth has been around 14-19 per cent. During 1994-2000 period, total 
assets in terms of GDP grew from 67 to 81 per cent; the share of foreign assets and that of claims on 
government decreased, reaching 12 per cent of GDP, and that of domestic private sector increased form 22.5 
to 33 per cent (Fig.10). In particular at end-1999 claims on enterprises represented 23 per cent of GDP, on 
households 12 per cent. At 2000-end total loans to domestic sectors equalled 1,6 billion tolar (7 billion US$); 
the share of national currency loans increased up to 90 per cent of total loans in 1997 and then declined to 85 
per cent. Total loans represent 40 per cent of GDP, of which 6 percentage points are those denominated in 
foreign currency (mainly to private enterprises). Loans to private sectors accounts for 35 per cent of GDP: 23 
per cent to enterprises and non-profit institutions and 12 per cent to households (Fig.11 and 12). The 
economic environment for financial and banking intermediation is relatively comfortable. The national gross 
saving ratio stood at 21 per cent of GDP at end-1993, increased to 25 per cent at the end of 2000. In the same 
period financial intermediation increased from 48 to 68 per cent of GDP. Since 1993 money multiplier – an 
indicator of banks’ ability in creating deposit money – remained between average values of 8-11 per cent; the 
level of private sector credit stood around 7 times the base money (Fig.13). In percentage of total banks’ 
liabilities, foreign exchange deposit share decreased from 23 (June 1993) to 17.6 per cent per cent in the first 
quarter of 1999 and then increased again reaching  20.8 per cent at end-2000 (Fig.14). 
3.2 Market structure 
At the end of 1999 there were 579 branches and agencies (650 at end-1998). On average there were 
3,433 inhabitants per branch (3,044 in 1998). Total employees in the banking sector stood at 10,386, almost 
unchanged in these last years. Out of the 25 operational banks in 1999, three are State-owned, five are State-
controlled, 13 are private owned by domestic entities and four are controlled by non-residents. Since end-
1997 market shares remained almost unchanged. State-owned banks account for 41 per cent of total assets; 
including all banks with significant State participation (the Group Nova Ljubljanska Banka) the share 
increases to 49 per cent. Private banks has a 46 per cent share while foreign-owned banks represent 4,8 per 
cent. In the past three years, assets shares changed little (Fig.15). Banking groups have been reduced by 
M&A and liquidation from four in 1997 to one since 1999. The concentration of banking system is high and 
constant: the first seven banks account for almost 74 per cent of total assets (72 per cent at end-1996); the 
first three – two of which are State-owned – for 51 per cent (Fig.16). With the first phase of gradual 
privatisation, launched during 2000, the overall State-owned equity stake should be reduced by 30 per cent. 
3.3 Efficiency and risks 
Interest rates declined substantially until the third quarter of 1999. Since then the effective average rate 
on loans lies between 6 and 5.5 per cent while the range for time deposit (over 1 year) is 5-4,5 per cent. 
Effective interest rates on loans declined faster than rates on deposits especially during 1998. Between the 
end-1997 and the first quarter of 1999 the spread on interest rates decreased from 2.5 to one percentage point 
(Fig.17). The official discount rate, 25 per cent until April 1993, was gradually reduced to 8 per cent in May 
2000 before increasing to 9 and the to 10 per cent before year-end.. The Lombard rate stands always one 
percentage point above the discount rate. Interbank market rates started to stabilise in 1995. On average rates 
stood around 12-14 per cent in 1995-96 and decreased to 7 per cent in 1999-2000 (Fig. 18). At December 
1998 capital adequacy was on average equal to 16 per cent. When the Banking Law introduced new rules 
(June 1999) for determining the ratio, capital adequacy fell, reaching an average of 13.6 in June 2000. 
Individual banks’ capital ratios vary from 8 to 35 per cent; three banks had capital adequacy ratio below 10 
per cent; nine banks between 11 and 15 per cent, twelve banks up to 30 per cent and one bank over 30 per 
cent. In 1994-97 problem assets (categories B-E) decreased from 14 to 10 per cent of total assets; in 1999, 
partially influenced by a new accounting methodology, the share increased to 11.5 per cent (11.8 per cent by 
June 2000). Non performing assets (substandard, doubtful and loss; categories C, D,E) show a constant   64
decline from 8.2 per cent in 1994 to 5.2 per cent in June 2000 (Fig.19).  
4. Financial System 
4.1 Other financial intermediaries.  
At end-1999, non-monetary financial intermediaries included 46 Authorised Investment Companies, 
15 mutual funds and 13 insurance companies and 80 leasing companies. Total balanced sheet of non-
monetary financial institution does not exceed half of credit institutions. Authorised Investment Companies 
hold a share of 57 per cent of the balance sheet of non-bank financial intermediaries. Insurance and 
reinsurance companies are about half of the size of Authorised Investment Companies. In 2000 gross 
premiums of Slovene insurance sector, including mutual insurance companies, stands around 1 billion US$ 
(4,7 per cent of GDP), up 30 per cent on the previous year; non-life premiums (840 million US$) increased 
by 35 per cent; life premiums climbed 17 per cent but they stand at the modest level of 160 million US$. The 
only foreign presence is that of the German Merkur Insurance and of the joint venture between the Austrian 
EA-Generali AG and SKB Bank. Furthermore, it is highly concentrated: the first company (Triglav) has a 
market share of 54 per cent. To satisfy the EU’s harmonisation schedule, in January 2000 a privatisation law 
was finally passed. A substantial public stake in Triglav was to be sold to foreign strategic partner but private 
shareholders, namely the important pharmaceutical company Lek, opposed this plan. A legal procedure was 
open in order to determine the constitutionality of the entire law and since May 2000 the Constitutional 
Court suspended its implementation.  
4.2 The equity market.  
Under the former FRY regional equity markets were not allowed; the Ljubljana Stock Exchange 
(LJSE) reopened in 1990. Total market capitalisation reached 1,138 billion tolar at the end of 2000, 27.8 per 
cent of GDP; turnover was equal to 270 billion tolar, 6.6 per cent of GDP (Fig.20-21). The performance of 
LJSE, as measured by the market index (SBI=1000 in January 1994), has been particularly satisfactory in 
1997-98 when SBI recorded a 18.7 and 21.4 per cent increments at year-end; at the end of 2000 SBI closed 
at 1808, almost unchanged from 1999. In 2000 LJSE activities were fuelled by M&A in the industrial sectors 
(those announced in the banking sector did not take place) but, in general, were negatively influenced by 
uncertainty and unfulfilled expectations about the privatisation process and the further opening up of the 
Slovenian capital market. Rules regarding portfolio foreign investment were eased in March 1999 but the 
share of foreign ownership did not responded as expected: in Febraury 2001 it stands at 7.88 per cent of 
market capitalisation against the highest share (12.2 per cent) recorded in May 1998. 
4.3 The money market.  
According to IMF (March 2000 and May 2001) Slovenian monetary policies can suffer from the 
weaknesses of the interest rate transmission mechanism. Lack of a competitive domestic financial market 
structure  – few banks dominate both interbank and lending markets – is the basic reason for these 
inefficiencies but they are also the results of past BoS’s policies (high-yield sterilisation instruments, 
agreement on a deposit rate ceiling, capital controls) which limited competition and reduced interbank 
market to an overnight lending facility. Recently BoS and Treasury started to implement measures aimed at 
deepen the money market and improve the interest rate transmission mechanism such as the expansion of 
monetary instruments’ menu and the de-indexation of private financial contracts.  
5.  The Payment System 
5.1 Payments by non-banks 
All payments by legal entities – other than credit institutions – are processed by the Agency for 
Payments (APP); funds on accounts of commercial banks’ clients are cleared through settlements accounts of 
credit institutions with the BoS. In 1999 APP processed 84 million payment orders, 63.8 per cent of which 
cashless (in 1997 orders were 87.5 million). Payment transactions are carried out by APP through giro and 
other accounts held by legal entities (at end-1999 APP managed around 75,000 giro and other accounts). 
Since 1994 the payment system has been reformed – both in the small and large value transactions – in order 
to reach European standard. In 1998 (October) Giro Cleaning – for low value, non-urgent payments not 
exceeding 3 million tolar – was implemented. BoS is the clearing and settlement agency for the Giro 
Cleaning participants operating on a net basis. The next reform step is the Integrated Small Value Payment   65
System which will integrate the existing clearing mechanisms for settlement through Real Time Gross 
Settlement (RTGS) and will incorporate all payment services (Giro Cleaning, ATM and POS, cheque and 
direct debit systems). At the end of 2000 the number of credit cards issued in Slovenia was over 840,000; 
debit cards numbered over one million (Fig.22). Credit cards issued by banks represent 62 per cent of the 
total, down from 73 per cent at end-1996. In 2000 there has been almost 56 million payments with credit 
cards, for a total value of 337 billion tolar (in 1996 payments were numbered 24 million for 106 billion tolar 
value). Between March 1996 and December 2000 the number of ATMs increased from 334 to 865; that of 
EFT/POS from 2,319 to 21,723 (Fig.23). 
5.2 Interbank payment system. 
In March 1997 reserve accounts of all banks were transferred from APP to BoS; in April 1998 also 
giro accounts of commercial banks were transferred to BoS and the RTGS system for interbank payments 
was initiated. RTGS handles pure interbank payments pursued through the standard and via the SWIFT 
network; the system links 30 domestic banks and BoS and is sized to cope with more than 2,000 transaction 
per day. The next step, which started to be implemented during 1999, is that of moving the accounts of all 
legal entities to the banking system. According to the reform’s schedule, accounts’ transfer will end by 2001; 
in the meantime banks will be proving their capacity to perform domestic and international payments for 
their clients. APP will cease to operate in the last quarter of 2001.    66
 
Slovenia: Main Economic Indicators 
 
  1997 1998 1999  2000 
      
Population (mid-year estimation)   1,984,923  1,978,334  1,987,756  1,990,094 
Exchange rate (end-year)        
  - Tolar per 1 US$    169.18  161.20  196.77  227.38 
  - Tolar per 1 Euro   186.73  188.93  197.32  211.51 
Gross Domestic Product       
  - current  market price (billion Tolar)   2,907  3,254  3,648  4,046 
  - real growth rate   4.6  3.8  4.9  4.8 
  - per capita (US$)   9,163  9,878  10,109  9,128 
Current account      
  - Trade Balance (million US$)  -776  -789  -1,245  -1,081 
  - Current account balance (mill.US$)  11  -147  -783  -594 
  - Current account balance (% GDP)  0.1  -0,8  -3.9  -3.3 
Unemployment rate (annual average)          
  - Stat. Office definition  14.4  14.5  13.6  12.2 
  - Annual survey (ILO definition)  7.4  7.9  7.6  7.0 
External debt       
  - million US$   4,176  4,959  5,491  6,217 
  - Tot. Ext. Debt / Exports G&S (%)  39.5  44.1  51.1  58.9 
  - Tot. Debt Service / Exports G&S  8.8  13.8  8.0  9.8 
Inflation rate (annual average)          
  - Consumer Price Index   8.4  8.0  6.2  8.9 
Reserves (million US$)          
  - BoS international reserves   3,297  3,573  3,059  2,859 
  - Banks foreign exchange   1,080  1,209  1,056  1,124 
Overall Budget Balance      
  - million Tolar   -34,081  -25,591  -23,267  55,520 
  - % GDP   -1.2  -0.8  -0.6  -1.4 
M1 (billion Tolar)   266  327  392  419 
  - % GDP   9.1  10.0  10.7  10.4 
M3 (billion Tolar)   1,386  1,676  1,951  2,284 
  - % GDP   47.7  51.5  53.5  56.5 
Banks' Assets (billion Tolar)   2,094  2,413  2,763  3,268 
Banks' Loans (billion Tolar)   853  1,100  1,366  1,619 
  - National currency   759  961  1,188  1,369 
  - Foreign currency   93  138  179  250 
  - to enterprises   532  675  772  933 
  - to households   241  303  439  495 
Interbank interest rate (end period)          
  - daily market   9.8  5.6  6.8  6.2 
  - overnight   9.8  5.6  6.9  5.8 
Banks' rates (average on Tolar)          
  - Credit rate (short-term)   9.0  5.9  5.1  4.5 
  - Deposit rate (one year)  4.5  2.0  2.0  2.0 
BoS's rates       
  - Discount rate   10.0  10.0  8.0  10.0 
  - Lombard rate   11.0  11.0  9.0  11.0 
Lubljana Stock Exchange      
  - Market capitalisation (billion Tolar)  399  710  920  1,138 
  - Market capitalisation (% GDP)  13.7  21.8  25.3  28.1 
  - Turnover (billion Tolar)   108  173  266  270 
  - Turnover (% GDP)   3.7  5.3  7.3  6.7 
  - SBI   1,405  1,706  1,806  1,808 
        67
 
Fig. 1 GDP Real Growth 

























Source: Bank of Slovenia 
 
 
Fig. 2 Prices and Wages Developments 
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Fig. 3 Import and Export of Goods 
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Fig. 4 Balance of Payments Development  













Source: Bank of Slovenia (*) Estimated 
 
 
Fig. 5 Consolidated Central Government Budget 
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Source: Bank of Slovenia; Budget for year 2000; (*) Estimated. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Central Gov. Budget: External financing 
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Fig. 7 External Debt  
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Fig. 8  Foreign Exchange Reserves 
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Source: Bank of Slovenia 
 
 
Fig. 9 Exchange Rate Developments 
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Fig. 10 Banks’ Assets Development 
(Percentage on GDP)  
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Fig. 11 Loans Developments 

















Source: Bank of Slovenia 
 
Fig. 12 Loans to Private Domestic Sectors 
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Fig. 14 Foreign Currency Deposit 
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Fig. 15 Banking Ownership Structure   69
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Fig. 16 Assets of Top Banks 










































Source: Bank of Slovenia. (1) Over one year 
 
 
















Source: Bank of Slovenia. 
 
 
Fig. 19 Bad Loans of Slovenian Banks 
















Source: Bank of Slovenia Report on Supervision of Banking Op. 
 
 
Fig. 20 Stock Exchange: Indices 
















Source: Bank of Slovenia; Ljubljana Stock Exchange 
 
Fig. 21 Stock Exchange 
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1. The economic structure 
1.1 Economic background (1990-99) 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was constituted in April 1992, as a federation of the 
Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. FRY was subject to sanctions and international isolation from its 
foundation until recently; owing to war, the country lost markets and trade relationships between 1991 and 
1993. In 1993 the government kept real spending constant, increasing the nominal fiscal deficit to almost a 
third of GDP; as a result, by January 1994 the monthly inflation rate was more than 300 per cent, while 
industrial production was less than one third of its January 1991 value.  
A stricter macroeconomic policy succeeded in achieving some output growth in 1994-98; over this 
period, annual output growth and inflation averaged 6.5 per cent and 43 per cent respectively. The success of 
the government stabilisation program was helped by the large foreign exchange receipts from the sale of 
Serbian Telecom in 1997-98. 
The Kosovo crisis and the spring NATO air campaign, however, reduced 1999 real GDP by 20 per 
cent. Authorities’ measures to keep inflation under control (price controls, rationing, special taxes, 
confiscation) were unable to offset the impact of the external imbalances. The shortage of foreign currencies 
was reflected in the growing spreads between the official and the parallel market exchange rates. 
In summary, the Yugoslav 1990-99 average annual growth rate of GDP was -7 per cent; the industrial 
production followed a similar pattern, losing importance in GDP formation in favour of agriculture. In the 
first years of the 1990s, Yugoslavia experienced two hyperinflations, stemmed from both exogenous and 
endogenous causes (state disintegration, prolonged war, sanctions, monetisation of the deficits); the second 
hyperinflation was stopped for a few months by a stricter macroeconomic conduct, but the lack of 
consistency in the government financial discipline and the absence of structural changes and privatisation 
programs caused old problems to emerge again. The accumulation of foreign debt proceeded through the 
whole decade, up to 12 billion USD in 2000 (Table 1); trade deficits have been until now the rule (Tables 2 
and 3).  
1.2 Recent developments 
Output has only partially recovered from the bombing devastation, and it is now at less than a half of 
its 1989 level; unemployment, including workers on involuntary leave, is about one half of the labour force. 
The increase of the ratio of external debt to GDP to 140 per cent without debt servicing is the main signal of 
macroeconomic fragility. 
GDP is estimated to have risen by 5 per cent in 2000, but the severe drought has sharply reduced 
agricultural output: the economic effects of the Kosovo war will be recovered only partially this year. The 
12-month retail price inflation rose in December to 113 per cent, following the price liberalisation introduced 
by the government; average wages and pensions dropped in August 2000 to 90 DM per month and 68 DM 
per month, respectively.  
The output decline in 1999 and the decision to stimulate economic activity in 2000 have compressed 
government revenues in real terms by a cumulative 40 per cent in the last two years. The need to keep public 
deficits low (0.9 per cent of GDP in 2000) has led to a severe compression of spending, with the exception of 
defence; nevertheless, the fiscal deficit on accrual basis is at least 3 per cent of GDP, without considering the 
debt service, that is over 100 per cent of GDP. The Montenegro
5 general government deficit is estimated to 
run at about 8 per cent of GDP, and will be entirely financed by US and EU grants. The economic separation 
of Montenegro from Serbia is the result of political strife: the exchange of goods is at the lowest level ever 
registered, and payments have been halted. Nevertheless, the Montenegrin economy is still dependent on 
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5 After Montenegro has stopped contributing to the federal budget and the federal budget has stopped contributing to the 
Montenegrin pension funds, the Montenegro public finances are actually separated from the rest of the Federation.    73
Serbia: in 1995 the average dependency ratio of Montenegrin enterprises from Serbian exports and imports 
was 68 per cent; the search for new markets induced by trade difficulties reduced the ratio to 42 per cent in 
1999, but the balance of payments deficit has increased.  
High inflation together with reduced aggregate supply is explained by large monetary financing: the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia and the rest of the banking system have been used until recently to finance 
state owned enterprises and the agricultural sector. During the run-up to the elections of September 2000, as 
the last subsidising economic policy measure, the 12-month growth rate of currency in circulation rose from 
32 per cent (June) to 58 per cent (see Table 4). 
2. The financial system 
2.1 Monetary policy 
With amendments to the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the Bank’s governor is now 
independent from other state bodies and has got full authority to quantify domestic money and to supervise 
commercial banks. The government has lost its right to set the dinar’s exchange rate; now it only establishes 
the regime of the exchange rate, opting for hard currency exchange rates on the basis of market principles. 
There will be no “currency board”, nor the direct use of foreign currency, as in Montenegro and in Kossovo. 
The ban on the use of foreign currencies in transactions and the penalties for those who do not respect it have 
been maintained. 
Governor Dinkic announced his monetary goals for 2001. He did not give any anticipation of money 
supply trends, but he stated the future amounts of the NBY’s net domestic assets or “primary money”, which 
includes cash, as well as deposits of banks and state accounts in the central bank. The Governor has 
committed himself to not increase primary money in the first quarter of the year by more than 500 million 
dinars, and, more in general, to set strict monetary conditions, aiming to abate the growth rate of average 
retail prices by one per cent per month. The emitted surplus dinars are to be annulled by the sale of the 
NBY’s securities, but the near non-existence of bond markets makes open market operations extremely 
difficult. An expanded use of interest rates in the dinar’s quantitative regulation has been announced. Also 
projected is the co-ordination of the discount rate with market rates.  
2.2 The structure of the banking and financial systems 
Yugoslavia has a highly concentrated banking system: although there are 79 banks, three of them 
(Beogradska Bank, Vojvodina Bank and Yugo Bank) centralise almost all the bank assets in the country. 
There are also small and medium sized banks: some of them have been established by profitable firms to 
manage their own finances in the absence of reliable intermediaries. Anyway, these small private banks have 
got limited capacity to provide loans in any significant volume relative to the needs of the economy. 
The balance sheet of the three largest banks has decreased from a total of 22 billion USD in 1989 to 
9.5 billion USD in 1999; in the same time, the share in dinars has decreased form 17.5 billion USD to 0.4 
billion USD. Around 75% of the liabilities are foreign currency loans, both from abroad and old foreign 
currency savings. Domestic currency deposits amount to around 6 billion dinars, and liquidity is estimated to 
be around 600 million YUD, meaning that banks can only offer basic services, such as transfers, letters of 
credit, or guarantees. Some foreign banks have already been granted a license, and several others have shown 
some interest in entering into the Yugoslav market. The insurance sector is based on motor, third party, fire 
and theft, with little life insurance business; the market is controlled by two large state owned companies. 
Payment transaction are mainly cash. Payments with giro money are burdened by fees which total to 0.6 per 
cent of each payment, and banks usually pay no interest on sight deposits, making cash more profitable than 
giro money as mean of payment. 
2.3 Efficiency and risks 
Although the 1988 Banking Act aimed to ensure that banks respect internationally accepted prudential 
standards and auditing procedures, only a handful of the smaller banks are thought to be able to respect it. A 
strict implementation of the Banking Act would lead the majority of the intermediaries to declare 
bankruptcy, including the National Bank of Yugoslavia. The three major banks are thought to have bad debts 
of between 80-90% of total loans; main debtors are state enterprises.   74
The government has not yet planned a strategy for a recovery process of banks’, although advisors to 
the National Bank of Yugoslavia are preparing an audit of individual banks. In the Serbian banking sector, a 
50 per cent of the loan portfolio is estimated to be non-performing. Moreover, reported capital is probably 
overstated, owing to the practice of reporting accrued interest of non-performing loans as income. Banks also 
need an improved system for the protection of deposits, as the deposit insurance scheme in force has been 
impossible to implement. 
Confidence in the banking sector is extremely low, as a result from the freezing of the foreign 
currency deposits and pyramid scheme scandals in 1992-93. Moreover, hyperinflation in 1989 and 1992-93 
wiped out domestic currency saving accounts.  
2.4  The situation in Montenegro 
In the past three years, Montenegro has come to operate as a separate state from Serbia, taking control 
over the main instruments of economic policy. After the introduction of the Deutsche Mark as a parallel 
currency with the Dinar (November 1999), a “Monetary Council of the National Bank of Montenegro” was 
set up to foresee monetary and foreign currency policy. In November 2000, the DM became the sole legal 
tender, and a law on Montenegro’s central bank was passed.  
The National Bank of Yugoslavia has recently moved to re-establish a payment system in DM 
between Serbia and Montenegro; the electronic payments between the two republics had been severed by 
Belgrade in 1999, as a consequence of Montenegrin introduction of a foreign currency as mean of payment. 
Two years of severe negative shocks (1998 and 1999) have affected the budget of Montenegro, which had 
been until then approximately balanced. The cash deficit of the consolidated budget is financed through 
commercial banks’ credits, partly explaining their difficult situation, and draining 2% of the central budget 
expenditure for the payment of interests on these loans. 
In March, 2000, 5 branch offices of Yugoslav banks and 10 local banks were operating in 
Montenegro; 5 Montenegrin banks have developed from the transformation of the former Investiciona Banka 
Titograd in 1990. Out of the 5 major banks, only two (Mortgage Bank and Montenegro Commercial Bank) 
hold considerable shares of private capital. Competition in the banking system is limited: interest rates, 
although not legally regulated, are ruled by a codex of the Association of Banks. 
The Montenegrin banking system shows a strict relationship between shareholders and borrowers 
through connected lending: these shareholders and large borrowers gain power over the bank’s business 
policy as members of the managing board. Loans are mostly financed by shareholders’ funds, deposits of 
legal entities and borrowing from public agencies: due to the public loss of confidence in the banking 
system, induced by the Yugoslav seizure of foreign exchange deposits and by the unpaid government bonds, 
household savings are in practice non-existent in banks, and cannot be used for financial intermediation. A 
so-called Middle Authorisation is needed to conduct foreign exchange transactions; non-authorised banks 
operate via Montenegro Bank. 
Two thirds of the assets in the Montenegrin banking system’s balance sheet are in foreign currency or 
gold, held mainly for international transactions. The loan portfolio is only 10% of total assets: three quarters 
of it have a maturity below one year (commercial papers, claims to the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and 
accrued interest and fees), whereas the long-term positions are almost completely FRY’s bonds. Liabilities, 
both in foreign currency (60% of the total) and in YUD are predominantly short-term; the major part of 
deposits are giro accounts of legal entities. Determination of bad loans is still extremely difficult, evaluation 
of collateral nearly impossible. Even if loans are sometimes covered up to three times by mortgages, the 
value of the mortgages is often unrealistic, because of a highly illiquid market in real estate, long bankruptcy 
procedures, and difficulties in defining ownership in real estate. The payment system is highly centralised: 
the clearing and settlement agency ZOP holds a monopoly position over the system, even after the 
introduction of the DM. 
 
2.5 The financial market organisation 
The regulatory framework in financial markets is based on the authorities’ discretionary powers, and is 
related to rent-seeking behaviours: legal and economic regulations do not correspond to economic needs, or   75
they are not implemented. Property rights and contracts have no adequate protection. As a result, the capital, 
foreign currency and money markets exist, at the best, only as a matter of form, or they have been transferred 
to the black market.  
Some financial institutions already exist (for example, the commission for securities, the stock market, 
and the brokers), but the decision-making process actually takes place outside the institutional structure. 
Stockholding has been almost completely abandoned, due to the lack of ownership rights’ protection; trade 
in stocks is nearly non-existent (Table 6). On February 19
th, 2001,  the Belgrade Stock Exchange signed an 
Agreement on Co-operation with the Athens Stock Exchange: the program includes several aspects of the 
financial market and infrastructure, from training, software and hardware packages, up to the maintenance 







1997 1998 1999 2000 Prel.
Real economy (change in percent)
        Real GDP 10.1 1.9 -15.7 5.0
        Industrial production 9.5 3.6 -22.5 10.9
        Retail prices (annual average) 18.5 29.8 42.4 71.8
        Unemployment rate (in percent) (2) 25.8 25.1 26.5 27.3
        Average wage (DM) 206 169 109 99
General government finances (percent of GDP) (3)
        Revenue (4)                 ….                 ….                 …. 38.8
        Expenditure                 ….                 ….                 …. 39.7
        Cash balance                 ….                 ….                 …. -0.9
        Commitment balance (5)                 ….                 ….                 …. -3.0
Money supply (end of period, percent change)
        M1 (6) 66.5 17.1 47.3 85.1
        M2 (6) (7) 23.9 69.4 67.6 61.4
Balance of payments (in billions of USD)
        Merchandise exports 2.4 3.0 1.7 1.9
        Merchandise imports 4.8 4.8 3.3 3.8
        Trade balance -2.4 -1.9 -1.6 -1.8
        Current account balance -1.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.0
        Foreign debt  (8)                 ….                 ….                 …. 11.7
        Gross official reserves (in months of imports                  ….                 …. 0.3 0.5
               of goods and services) (1.1) (1.5)
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) (9)                 …. 6.7 12.6 30.0
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA/MONTENEGRO):
SELECTED ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS, 1997/2001 (1)
Sources: International Monetary Fund and G17.
(1) With the exception of money supply and foreign debt, data for 1999 and 2001 exclude Kosovo. GDP excludes Kosovo throughout. (2) Excluding worke
holiday" (about 20-25 percent of the labor force in recent years). (3) Fiscal operations of all levels of government, except for Montenegro where it exclude
governments. (4) Excludes foreign grants. (5) Excludes arrears of local governments and most interest payments on foreign debt due but not paid. (6) Fro
excludes Montenegro. (7) Frozen foreign currency deposits are excluded and other other foreign currency deposits are valued at parallel market rates unt
and at YUD 30 per DM thereafter. (8) Includes arrears on unpaid imports of fuel and gas. (9) From 2000 onwards exchange rate is the official rate determ  77
Table 2 
 
Countries 1996 1997 1998 1999 (1)
Exports
Bosnia-Herzegovina 328.2 458.8 614.9 304.1
Macedonia 211.7 221.6 247.5 176.7
Germany 204.0 337.8 332.7 165.1
Italy 202.0 317.7 309.9 156.4
Switzerland 99.4 189.1 246.0 105.7
Other countries 972.7 1,152.0 1,107.0 589.6
   Total exports 2,018.0 2,677.0 2,858.0 1,497.06
Imports
Germany 524.7 650.6 603.9 404.8
Italy 437.1 488.1 516.9 331.5
Russia 225.4 438.4 527.1 274.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina 186.8 288.6 251.2 187.8
Bulgaria 220.2 124.5 79.4 151.6
Greece 147.3 181.1 179.5 146.9
Macedonia 215.5 292.1 246.2 122.4
Austria 123.4 158.1 154.8 113.9
Romania 123.4 102.0 98.1 108.6
Hungary 128.4 127.8 116.6 101.8
Other countries 1,786.8 1,974.7 2,075.3 1,352.1
   Total imports 4,119.0 4,826.0 4,849.0 3,295.7
   Trade balance -2,101.0 -2,149.0 -1,991.0 -1,798.1
Source: V. Gligorov, Yugoslavia: Political change, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.
(1) Excluding Kosovo and Metohia.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA:
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY MAIN PARTNERS
(cif-fob, millions of USD)
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Table 3 
 
Commodity groups 1996 1997 1998 1999 (1)
Exports
Food and live animals 407.9 280.8 346.8 293.9
Beverages and tobacco 102.4 75.2 41.2 22.0
Crude materials, inedible, except fuel 86.7 129.1 127.4 82.0
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc. 47.9 55.5 69.9 36.2
Animal and vegetable oils, fats, waxes 9.1 20.6 23.1 8.1
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 169.0 322.0 278.4 144.0
Manufactured goods class. by materials 641.5 911.0 855.1 465.9
Machinery and transport equipment 226.2 239.3 290.3 184.6
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 294.0 419.8 378.1 218.8
Commodities not classified by kind 33.4 223.7 447.7 42.1
   Total exports 2,018.0 2,677.0 2,858.0 1,497.6
Imports
Food and live animals 503.3 586.8 490.3 277.9
Beverages and tobacco 36.6 83.8 50.2 41.1
Crude materials, inedible, except fuel 428.3 401.5 303.6 230.2
Mineral fuels, lubricants, etc. 573.6 754.7 743.2 592.3
Animal and vegetable oils, fats, waxes 11.1 8.6 10.0 7.8
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 587.0 640.2 686.1 519.9
Manufactured goods class. by materials 816.7 1,004.3 1,039.9 674.6
Machinery and transport equipment 799.2 868.1 1,013.6 713.6
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 327.4 374.5 391.9 211.3
Commodities not classified by kind 35.8 103.6 120.2 27.0
   Total imports 4,119.0 4,826.0 4,849.0 3,295.7
   Trade balance -2,101.0 -2,149.0 -1,991.0 -1,798.1
Source: V. Gligorov, Yugoslavia: Political change, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.
(1) Excluding Kosovo and Metohia.
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA:
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY COMMODITY GROUPS
(cif-fob, millions of USD)
 
 




Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar.
Net foreign reserves (1) 4,589.2 3,641.5 9,108.7 13,652.4 13,652.4 13,652.4
    Gross foreign reserves  (2) 11,940.6 11,723.0 17,404.3 24,491.1            ....            ....
    Gross reserve liabilities (3) -7,351.4 -8,081.5 -8,295.6 -10,838.7            ....            ....
Net domestic assets (4) 4,010.3 5,449.6 669,8 -1,446.4 -1,446.4 -946.4
    Domestic credit 22,410.4 24,159.7 24,958.1 26,524.6 26,524.6 27,024.6
         Net claims on government 1,758.3 3,078.4 2,793.2 3,347.3 3,347.3 3,847.3
               Claims 2,610.8 3,888.8 4,247.6 4,385.1            ....            ....
               Liabilities -852.5 -810.4 -1,454.4 -1,037.8            ....            ....
         Net claims on banks 22,655.6 22,979.0 23,460.7 23,845.6 23,845.6 23,845.6
               Claims 31,460.4 31,963.0 32,221.1 33,546.3            ....            ....
               Liabilities -8,804.8 -8.984.0 -8,760.4 -9,700.7            ....            ....
         Net claims on the rest of the economy -2,003.5 1,897.7 -1,295.8 -668.3 -668.3 -668.3
               Claims 2,697.6 2,994.0 3,000.6 4,020.0            ....            ....
               Liabilities -4,701.1 -4,891.7 -4,296.4 -4,688.3            ....            ....
    Other assets (net) (5) -18,400.1 -18,710.1 -24,288.3 -27,971.0 -27,971.0 -27,971.0
Reserve money 8,599.5 9,091.1 9,778.5 12,206.0            ....            ....
    Currency in circulation 6,688.3 6,202.5 7,159.4 9,026.4            ....            ....
    Reserve deposits 1,911.2 2,888.6 2,619.1 3,179.6            ....            ....
          Required reserves 1,215.3 1,657.2 1,670.9 2,074.0            ....            ....
          Excess reserves (6) 695.9 1,231.4 948.2 1,105.6            ....            ....
Source: International Monetary Fund.
(1) Dec. 2000 and Mar. 2001: program floor. (2) Defined as monetary gold, holding of SDRs, any reserve position in the IMF, holdings of foreign exchange in
convertible currencies by the NBY, and any short-term foreign exchange accounts held abroad. Excludes frozen assets of the FRY, undivided assets of the SFRY, long-
term assets, NBY redeposits with the domestic commercial banks, any assets in nonconvertible currencies, encumbered reserve assets, reserve assets pledged as
collateral for foreign loans, reserve assets pledged through forward contracts, and precious metals other than gold. (3) Gross reserve liabilities are subject to revision.
They are defined as any loan, deposit, swap (including any portion of the NBY gold that is collateralized), and forward liabilities of the NBY in convertible currencies to
residents and nonresidents; IMF purchases; borrowing from international capital markets; and bridge loans from the BIS, foreign banks, foreign governments, or other
financial institutions, irrespective of their maturity. Excludes long-term liabilities and any foreign liabilities not being serviced as of September 30, 2000. (4) Dec. 2000
and Mar. 2001: program ceiling. (5) Given the definition of net foreign reserves, gross foreign assets and liabilities excluded from net foreign reserves are captured in
other assets (net). For end-September 2000, the items excluded represented net foreign liabilities totaling dinars 21,758.3 million. (6) Comprises balances in giro
accounts and cash in commercial bank vaults.
Items
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: BALANCE SHEET OF THE NATIONAL BANK
OF YUGOSLAVIA AND PROGRAM TARGETS, 1999/2001
(in millions of dinars; end of period)
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Table 5 
KEY DATA FOR THE FIVE MAJOR BANKS  
IN THE MONTENEGRIN BANKING SYSTEM 
(units and millions of DM) 
Item Sep. 1999 in % of all banks
Number of employees 893      ....     
Capital and Reserves 62      74     
Loans in YUD 21      54     
Short term liabilities 276      93     
in foreign currency
Long term liabilities 1229      96     
in foreign currency











Total turnover 6,004    6,160    8,925   
out of which: Shares 125    310    301   
                   NBY bonds 2,713    364    0   
                   FRY bonds 1,465    2,900    613   
                   Commercial notes of companies 1,489    1,053    6,878   
Source: Belgrade Stock Exchange.
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